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Abstract 
This study looks at share-based payment in Norwegian publicly traded firms. A 
review of the history of stock options and the development of accounting and 
taxation legislations is presented. The paper is divided into two main parts where 
we first look at whether the implementation of IFRS-2 has caused any change in 
the use of stock options to CEOs and employees. Our findings show a drop, 
presumably in stock option grants, in most industries after the implementation, 
and we conclude that accounting legislation is one important exogenous variable 
that affects the use of stock options. The second part examines the relationship 
between stock options and company performance and we find both significant 
negative and insignificant relationships. We conclude that the relationship is 
indeterminable.  
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1. Introduction 
In this paper we are looking at what motivates the use of stock options as 
compensation to executives and employees in Norwegian publicly traded firms. 
Executive compensation is a subject that has received a great amount of attention 
for many years, especially in the US where executive pay has been higher than 
anywhere else (Nielsen and Randoey 2002). People have different opinions on 
whether executive compensation creates value for a firm, or if it is just a way of 
paying the executives even more. Some argue that most executives receive a high 
enough payment with their base salary and that this remuneration should be 
enough without them demanding more incentive-based compensation to take the 
actions shareholders request.  
 
Earlier studies have focused primarily on the US and many of them lack to 
identify the political and other socioeconomic factors that are relevant for 
executive stock option compensation (Hall and Murphy 2002). In our study we 
are looking at executive and employee stock options based on data from 
Norwegian companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange. Additionally we show 
that non-option based factors also affects the use of stock options as a 
compensation-tool (Oxelheim and Randoey 2008). We are looking at what we 
believe is the most important government regulation that has occurred within the 
last fifteen to twenty years that relates to stock options. Additionally we review 
other legislations proposed by the Norwegian Government, such as tax and 
accounting regulations.  
 
There have been major changes in regulations for firms listed on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange with respect to stock options. The era of stock options started in the 
beginning of the 1990s, but had a downturn because of changes in accounting 
legislations towards the end of the decade (NOU 2000:21, “Lønninger og 
opsjoner”). In this period, Scandinavian firms remarkably started to use stock 
options as a form of compensation, but in a much smaller scale than the US 
pioneers (Oxelheim and Randoey 2008). This was an inexpensive way for firms to 
grant stock options since there were no clear accounting regulations for stock 
options (Sellaeg and Johansen 2005). Some have described this period as a “black 
economy”. The only regulation firms had to follow was the tax legislations. This 
practice has also changed over the past two decades. The entry of International 
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Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) in 2005 for publicly traded firms on Oslo 
Stock Exchange, IFRS-2 for share-based payment, changed the way publicly 
traded firms had to report their accounting (Sellaeg and Johansen 2005). 
 
The data used in this thesis contains information about the 50 largest companies 
listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange in 2012 based on market value, which accounts 
for approximately 95 % of the total market value on the exchange. The year of 
interest is 2005 when IFRS-2 became effective, but we also want to examine the 
effects prior to and after this year. Thus, we investigate if this exogenous variable 
has affected the use of options in any way. Our data, ranging from 2001 until the 
end of 2012, should be sufficient to capture any effect. 
 
This thesis contributes with newly updated data from companies listed on the Oslo 
Stock Exchange until the end of 2012, with the latest annual report used in this 
thesis published June 21st 2013. This provides the newest information about the 
use of stock options and other remuneration practices on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange. Thus, we enlighten an important topic which has been much written 
about in other countries, but has received very little attention in Norway. 
1.1 Structure 
The thesis is structured into eight sections, each with subsections. The first 
contains the introduction and the hypotheses that will be tested. The next section 
provides the literature review that the thesis builds its framework upon, and what 
the hypotheses aim to reveal. The literature review leads back to the US from 
where the Norwegian option history relates and ends up where the stock options 
practice is today. The third and fourth sections address what we believe are the 
main exogenous variables that affect the use of stock options, namely the 
accounting rules and taxation legislations respectively. The paper provides a brief 
description of past and present practices of these rules and legislations. The fifth 
and sixth sections describe the methodology and the data used. The results and 
interpretation of the results are found in section seven. The last section covers the 
summary and conclusion in addition to identifying limitations within this study 
and suggestions for future research.  
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1.2 Hypotheses 
The fundamental research question we seek to answer is: What influence the use 
of option-based remuneration in Norwegian publicly traded firms? More 
specifically our hypotheses are as follows:  
Government legislations 
During the past two decades the Norwegian Government has increased its focus 
on incentive-based payment and over the years new regulations have been 
developed with constraints on how to use stock options and other types of share-
based payments. Murphy (2012) illustrates this with the US accounting law, APB 
Opinion 25 Accounting for stock issued to employees, which imposes among other 
things a higher accounting charge for options that are issued in-the-money but not 
options issued at-the-money, known as “backdating”. The Government’s objective 
has been to avoid improper use of stock options, i.e. share-based payment is not 
supposed to be used just as a remuneration supplement, especially for the 
executives, with no means other than additional pay. To avoid these negative 
implications the government continuously changes the regulations concerning 
incentive-based payment, the change from Norwegian Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (NGAAP) to IFRS-2 is an example of this. Our first 
hypotheses seek to answer whether or not the Norwegian Government’s 
regulations have changed the use of these instruments from companies´ side and 
thus changed the use of stock options for executives and employees.  
 
HA,1:  Change in Government legislations (accounting, taxation and others) leads 
to change in the use of stock options.  
 
Our main focus is the IFRS-2 legislation on share-based payment; a more specific 
hypothesis is therefore:  
 
HA,2: The change from NGAAP to IFRS-2 changed the number of stock option 
grants in Norwegian companies. 
Performance 
The basic theory of why companies issue stock options to their employees is that 
the more a company’s stock price increases, the greater the profit from exercising 
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those options, in turn creating incentives that will motivate employees to focus on 
making the company more successful and more profitable. If employees and 
executives receive incentive payments, the companies’ aim is to get something in 
return. Hence, Board of Directors issue options as a mean for improved company 
performance. The third and fourth hypotheses concern the second part of our 
thesis - the linkage between stock options and performance. The first performance 
hypothesis seeks to answer if options drive performance. When firms are granting 
options to employees and executives, their intention is that performance will 
increase through aligning the interests between the company and its employees. 
One can also say that when performance is enhancing, companies afford to grant 
more options.  
 
HA,3: There is a positive relationship between options outstanding/granted and 
performance.  
 
Even if results show no change or negative change in performance the year 
options were granted, it could be that there are some delayed effects and that the 
change in performance on options granted cannot be seen until e.g. the year after 
the granting. We therefore add another performance hypothesis, which states: 
 
HA,4: There is a positive relationship between last year’s options granted and the 
following year’s performance. 
 
Both hypotheses are connected to agency theory; stock options are used to align 
the interest of the shareholders and employees. Based on this theory the 
relationship between stock options and performance should be positive. That is, as 
stock option grants increase, performance increases. Conversely, managerial 
power theory states that there is no significant relationship between compensation 
and performance (Murphy 2012). Hall and Murphy (2002) among others have 
found support for this theory in their studies. If we do not find support for our 
hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between options and performance, 
the results might support the managerial power theory that compensation is a 
result of managerial power and not an incentive-based contract.  
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2. Literature review 
Our thesis is based on previous work within the field of executive and employee 
compensation. In this review we will go through the history, theories and 
accounting legislations that have led to the share-based compensation policy we 
have today and we will start from the 1990s in the US. Subsequently we reflect 
upon the Scandinavian countries and identify which factors Norwegian companies 
build their compensation plan upon.  
2.1 Stock Option Theory 
An executive stock option is an option given to executives as an incentive to 
increase the company’s market value. Unlike for regular options there exists no 
external capital market for these options (Lai 2010). Through executive stock 
options the underwriter (shareholder) issues options to the recipient (executives), 
and if the stock price goes up both parties will benefit as the shareholder wants to 
maximize the stock price and the executive will receive greater pay (Lai 2010). 
Firms that use options as executive compensation typically issue them each year 
with the strike price set equal to the prevailing stock price. While maturities vary 
across firms, these options are typically long term. Firms usually restrict when and 
how these options can be exercised (Damodaran 2005). There are several varieties 
of stock options available, where the incentive stock option is the one relevant to 
us. An incentive stock option is subject to additional regulations designed to 
minimize taxes, e.g. in the US they are not taxed to the shareholder when granted 
or exercised, under the regular tax; tax is imposed only when the stock is sold 
(Bickley 2012).  
 
2.2 Why stock options as an executive compensation instrument? 
There are several arguments that support the use of stock options as executive 
compensation. We will mention four in particular that play a significant role when 
a firm chooses to grant stock options as an instrument for compensation. These 
four purposes for stock options are referred to as attract, retain, motivate and 
recognize (Hall and Murphy 2003). The companies want to attract the best 
executives, keep the best executives in the company, motivate them to work 
harder and to recognize their contribution to the company. Hall and Murphy 
(2002) discuss similar issues where highly skilled executives receive non-tradable 
options to stay in the firm until the options expire. The arguments are also stated 
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in the article of Drobetz et. al. (2007). The first argument is that stock options 
attract executives that are relatively less risk-averse and highly skilled, because 
they will see an upside in the firm. The second argument is that executives will 
remain in the firm when they receive non-tradable stock options. Thirdly, by 
giving stock options to executives it will make them think like owners when they 
become owners. The last argument is from an accounting perspective, stating from 
the firm perspective, that stock options will be regarded as a relatively cheap way 
of compensating executives.  
2.3 Methods of Pricing Stock Options 
To estimate the fair value of a stock option there are several conditions to account 
for. These include: market conditions, expected stock price volatility, risk-free 
rate, expected dividend, exercise price, underlying stock price, non-vesting 
conditions and option lifetime (Berner and Mikalsen 2009).  
 
The most common used models for valuing stock options is the Black-Scholes 
model (developed by Black and Scholes 1973) and the Binomial pricing model 
(developed by Cox, Ross and Rubenstein 1979). Both models are built upon the 
same theoretical assumptions and foundations, such as price behavior and the risk-
neutral valuation.  Even though the two models acts under similar assumptions the 
Black-Scholes is in continuous time while the binomial model provides a discrete-
time approximation. 
2.4 Principal-Agent Theory 
Principal-agent theory is the main theory that forms the basis for implementation 
of incentive systems. It considers how the principals delegate their interests to the 
agents, which is equivalent to the relationship between shareholders and 
employees. In agency relationships, the principal’s objective is typically to 
maximize the difference between the value received as a result of the agent’s 
actions and any compensation it makes to the agent. The theory predicts a 
negative relation between risk and incentives, or alternatively, a positive relation 
between risk aversion and incentives (Murphy 2012). Problems arise when the 
principal and agent do not share the same goal and/or there is asymmetric 
information. In the absence of some mechanism to align the interests of the two 
parties, the executives and/or employees do not care about the value generated for 
the shareholders (Besanko et.al. 2010). Stock options help ensure accountability 
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of employees’ actions and provide incentives to align the interests of shareholders 
and employees, thereby reducing or eliminating principal-agent problems 
according to Jensen and Meckling (1976).  
2.5 Optimal Contracting 
Efficient contracting concerns how to mitigate or eliminate the conflicts of 
interests between the principals (shareholders) and the agents (executives). The 
efficient contracts will be the ones that maximize shareholder value and at the 
same time are paying the executives an amount of compensation that convince 
him or her to take or remain in the job. In addition, the contracts have to recognize 
that executives are responding to the incentives specified (Murphy 2012).  
 
Holmstroem (1979) describes the optimal incentive contracts in a principal–agent 
setting where the principal knows exactly what actions he or she wants the agent 
to take, but the agent’s action is unobservable so he or she will not be able to say 
whether or not the agent in fact took that action. Holmstroem shows that the 
optimal contract will include any performance measure that is useful in 
determining what action the agent took and that any imperfect information about 
actions or states of nature can be used to improve the contracts.  This is, however, 
not applicable in the realistic case where the shareholders do not know precisely 
what actions they want the executives to take, and they have to trust their money 
to self-concerned executives specifically because they have superior skill or 
information in making investment decisions (Holmstroem 1992). 
2.6 CEOs’ pay from the 1980s until present 
The US has been pioneers for CEO pay the last century and our thesis will be 
based on the developments in the US and the entry into Norway. Further we will 
elaborate important events that have led up to where we are today considering 
CEO pay and compensation.  
 
Murphy (2012) states that the attempt of “explaining” the CEO pay without 
considering the causes and consequences of government interventions over the 
last century with regards to executive compensation is futile. During the 1990s 
there was an “explosion” in the use of stock options and Murphy (2012) describes 
six factors he believes contributed to this explosion. The subsequent paragraphs 
explain these factors. 
Master thesis Share-based payment and IFRS-2 02.09.2013 
Page 8 
 
It started with the pressure from shareholders for equity-based pay in the 1980s. 
Institutions, inefficient firms and shareholders encouraged that pay should be 
more linked to performance. In 1991, the US Security and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) came up with a new holding period rule. The six-month holding rule was 
reformed into no holding period, meaning that exercising options could 
immediately be sold after exercised.  
 
In 1992, SEC issued a new regulation called the SEC option disclosure rule. This 
disclosure rule stated that only the number of options granted and not the value of 
granted options, needed to be disclosed. One year later the Clinton administration 
decided on a new bill; a $1 million deductibility cap. This was probably one of the 
main outcomes that led to the increase in use of stock options. The purpose of this 
bill was not met since the intention was to reduce the amount of executive 
compensation. In 1995 the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) tried to 
issue a new accounting rule that granted options should be expensed at fair market 
value, without any success.  
 
During the 1990s the NYSE came up with a listing requirement. Top executives 
needed to get approval of their equity plans from shareholders. To avoid this 
regulation and bypass shareholders’ votes, options were given to lower level 
employees and lower level executives instead. After the scandals in firms like 
Enron, WorldCom, Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, Arthur Andersen and others in the 
start of the 21st century, the Congress in the US passed the Sabanes-Oxley act in 
2002 (Murphy 2012). Even though the primary intention behind this act was to 
regulate accounting firms, auditors and Board of Directors of publicly traded 
firms, the Congress also made it effective for executive pay.  
 
In 2005 “option backdating” became a known practice to the public. The principle 
behind this was backdating of option agreements. This means that companies set 
the grant date to a date when the stock price was lower, making the option in-the-
money instead of out-of-the-money. Companies that performed backdating 
falsified the option agreement and also committed accounting fraud (Murphy 
2012). The accounting regulations change in 2002 aimed to stop the illegal 
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backdating of options. By 2010 the SEC had finally managed the struggle against 
backdating completely.  
 
Because of these changes in the first decade of the new century, a shift in the 
composition of CEO pay and regulations led to a downturn in stock option grants 
to CEOs from 2001 to 2011, the first decrease of its kind since 1970 (Murphy 
2012). With the decline in stock option grants in 2001, the increase in stock grants 
as a combination of restricted stocks and performance shares became a fact 
towards and during 2011. The Internet Bubble in the early 2000s and the stock 
market crash were reasons for the drop in option grants and a rise in the use of 
restricted stocks. Murphy (2012) also states that over the last 60 years, during 
every recession, the use of stock options has dropped substantially.  
 
On June 15th in 2005 an accounting bill was finally issued for stock options, 
obliging companies to expense the granted stock options at fair value. During the 
financial crisis in 2007-2008, Lehman Brothers went bankrupt as one of many 
huge banks. “Limiting executive pay, however, was a long-time top priority for 
Democrats and some Republican congressmen, who viewed the Wall Street bonus 
culture as a root cause of the financial crisis” (Murphy 2012). In 2010-2011 the 
Dodd-Frank Act was among other things, a reform act of executive compensation. 
Its overall purpose was to regulate pay for all financial institutions (Murphy 
2012).  
 
The regulations above concern US companies, but there are also international 
regulations that affect the use of executive stock options in Norway. Accounting 
legislations for share-based payments in Norway did not follow any specific 
accounting rules before the international standard, IFRS-2, was implemented in 
2005 (Sellaeg and Johansen 2005). This legislation affected how to use stock 
options for Norwegian firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange. 
 
In Scandinavia and Europe stock option compensation plans became common by 
the end of the 1990s (Oxelheim and Randoey 2008). In the late 1990s and 
beginning of the 2000s, the status for CEO compensation in Norway and Sweden 
was small compared to other European countries and substantially smaller than in 
the US. This may be due to the degree of egalitarianism in these countries and that 
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the CEOs total compensation follow the domestic tendency rather than that of 
international companies (Randoey and Nielsen 2002). It follows that the 
Scandinavian countries are characterized by economic transparency, high taxes 
and a huge public sector. In 1999 Swedish CEOs made twelve times as much as 
the average employee and the difference was even smaller in Norway. 
Conversely, the CEOs of the S&P500 companies earned on average 475 times 
more than the average employee (Randoey and Nielsen 2002). Randoey and 
Nielsen (2002) argue that there are four main characteristics why CEO pay is at 
such a low level in Scandinavia. The first argument states that CEO pay is higher 
in the US because their position is more demanding and not because the position 
is important. The second argument regards the strong social democratic influence 
of union representation in the boards of most publicly traded firms in Scandinavia. 
The third argument states that the openness of CEO compensation to the public 
has forced boards to set the level of compensation at a decent level. The final 
argument states that the stockholders minority rights in Scandinavia have resulted 
in opposition of a high level of CEO pay. 
 
From 1995 to 1998 the use of options fell from 19,600 to 1,000 in Norway. It is 
said that more rigorous tax legislations may have been the cause of this change 
(NOU 2000: 21, “Lønninger og opsjoner”). The report we are referring to also 
states that option plans not only come from small IT start-ups, but that the 
majority of reported firms with these programs in fact are large and established 
firms within the industry and business services. Since 1998 the number of IT start-
ups has increased. In 2000 the Norwegian Government proposed a softening in 
taxation legislation for options, a reversal of the taxation rules prevailing in 1996. 
They argued that this change would increase the use of options, when they look at 
practices from other countries. The development of taxation legislation will be 
discussed further in section 4.  
 
With the complexity and continuous changes in the structure of stock options, 
regulations and accounting rules also change continuously, which IFRS-2 is an 
example of. In 2005 the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) 
released the IFRS-2, in which provided new rules and regulations to the use of 
stock options (IASB 2012). The most important change in Norway was the 
regulation that firms on the Oslo Stock Exchange needed to expense these stock 
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options. After January 1st 2005 the IFRS-2 and NGAAP are more or less the same 
(Berne and Mikalsen 2009) and due to this our focus concerning accounting rules 
will be based on IFRS-2 from this date. The IFRS-2 has the objective to specify 
the financial reporting by a firm when it undertakes a share-based payment 
transaction (IASB 2012).  
 
After the financial crisis in 2007-2008, the European Union introduced a directive 
for financial institutions called Capital Requirements Directive III (CRD III)1. The 
objective of this directive was to create specific policies concerning requirements 
for variable remuneration regarding share-based deferred payment. Development 
of certain performance criteria was subject to accounting rules in IFRS-2.  This 
directive proposes among other things that it should be a balanced ratio and 
limitation between fixed and variable remuneration in order to account for all 
types of risk, both current and future. CRD III also states how long the variable 
remuneration must be deferred and specific rules regarding how fast vesting of 
such instruments shall be succeed. New regulations demand more advanced 
knowledge in order to handle these share-based payment engagements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:329:0003:0035:EN:PDF 
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3. Accounting principles 
This section looks into the main differences between Norwegian GAAP and IFRS. 
3.1 NGAAP vs. IFRS: The transition 
The Norwegian GAAP has its core focus on the income statement and the main 
attention is given to measure the result for the prevailing period. The respective 
balance sheet under this legislation is of second importance. IFRS in general 
emphasizes the balance sheet and use definitions of assets and liabilities to 
structure the balance and the income statement. Only those that fulfilled the 
definitions of the IFRS will be a part of the balance sheet. The rest is placed on 
the income statement (Fardal 2007). 
3.2 NGAAP and the intrinsic value method 
The intrinsic value method is used in the Norwegian GAAP. The intrinsic value 
on the granting date is allocated as an expense over the vesting period. To avoid 
any of these respective costs, companies have set the intrinsic value equal to zero. 
The companies accounting profit will then be higher than the fair value, which is 
accounted for in the IFRS-2 regulation.  
 
The right to use the intrinsic value method disappeared after 2005 for publicly 
traded firms when IFRS-2 became effective. Companies responded negatively to 
this change and argued that firms’ results would become poorer due to this. Some 
have hypothesized it would cause a bad signal to the market and thus a fall in 
share prices, and that it would also be more difficult to acquire equity. Still, these 
arguments seem to be quite vague in terms of market efficiency and the transition 
seems to have no impact on companies’ cash flows. There is only an accounting 
related cost involved (Hole 2006). 
3.3 IFRS-2 and fair value  
The Norwegian GAAP is based on a transaction based historical cost model. This 
means that transactions have to be finalized before anything can appear in the 
accounts, according to Norwegian Accounting Act §4-1(1) (appendix 1). IFRS-2 
values a significant part of assets and liabilities at fair value, cf. Norwegian 
Accounting Act §5-9a (appendix 1). This means that when valuing at fair value, 
the transaction does not need to be completed in order to go into the accounts, 
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according to this legislation. Thus, unrealized profits would to a greater extent be 
allocated to the operating results using IFRS-2 instead of the Norwegian GAAP. 
Due to the different use of fair value, one will see a higher fluctuation in accounts 
using IFRS compared to the NGAAP (Fardal 2006). IFRS-2 do not specify how to 
value stock options or which valuation model should be used, it only specifies that 
one has to use a well-known model taking all of the different qualities of the stock 
option into consideration (Haugnes et al. 2011). 
3.4 Share-based payment 
One of the main focuses of the IFRS-2 is share-based payment and the main 
purpose is how to value options. With IFRS-2 the options for employees are 
valued at fair value and the costs are accrued over the vesting period. After 2005 
when the IFRS became effective, NGAAP was also forced to account share-based 
payment at fair value (Fardal 2007).  
 
The requirements of IFRS-2 with regards to share-based payment were not 
applicable to equity instruments granted on or before November 7th 2002. In light 
of the transition from NGAAP to IFRS, we demonstrate the challenge by quoting 
from an annual report of Nordic Semiconductor (year 2006, page 49): 
 
“Termination of the Current Options Program” 
“In light of the change in attitude toward options as a suitable compensation 
element, and the special problems the Company has with regard to cost 
accounting for payroll taxes on options in relation to showing accurate value 
creation for the Company, the Company decided to terminate the current options 
program in accordance with the decision at the extraordinary general meeting on 
December 7, 2005 and all current options were redeemed on February 21, 2006.” 
 
DNB’s annual report from 2005 also contains a statement, which could be 
interpreted as them refraining from continuing their incentive program or establish 
any new option based programs because of IFRS-2: 	  
“Subscription rights issued prior to 7 November 2002 and vested as at 1 January 
2005 have not been restated according to IFRS 2 - Share-based Payments. The 
DnB NOR Group has not issued subscription rights or established option schemes 
after 7 November 2002 and has thus been able to use the exception rule”. 
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From a review of the dataset we see that a total of six companies (listed below) 
used a stock option program, but terminated their program a year or two after the 
IFRS-2 regulation became effective. Nordic Semiconductor clearly state in their 
annual report from 2006 that they find it unmanageable to continue with their 
stock option program and as a result they dismissed the program. In addition, 
DNBs annual report from 2005 states that they will not issue any subscription 
rights that needed to be accounted for by the IFRS-2 regulations and that they did 
not subscribe any new option schemes after November 7th 2002 when the IFRS-2 
would apply. This could also be a determining factor why the other companies 
quit their option programs as well. Another argument against IFRS-2 is that it is 
too hard to determine the fair-value, thus expensive consultants are needed to 
manage this task (Hole 2006).  
 
Arguments that support IFRS-2 are among others, openness and transparency. 
Due to for instance the accounting scandals in 2001 in the US, as mentioned in the 
literature review, it is important to show every remuneration detail in the 
accounting statement. It is important for investors to see the compensation history 
for managers and employees in a firm, as this is part of the total costs for a 
company.  
 
Termination of stock option program: 
- Cermaq, year 2006 (annual report, page 41) 
- DNO, year 2006 (annual report, page 55) 
- Fred Olsen Energy, year 2006 (annual report, page 40)  
- Kongsberg Group, year 2006 (annual report, page 42) 
- Hydro, year 2007 (annual report, page 33) 
- Telenor, year 2007 (annual report, page 72) 
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4. Taxation history 
4.1 The taxation history of stock options in Norway from the 1990s 
From 1991 to 1995 an option that was sold or exercised in-the-money for 
management or employees was taxable to income tax. Options were taxable when 
exercised or sold and not at the time of granting. From 1996 the taxation 
legislation changed so that the receiver of an option had to pay tax on the option 
benefit when granting the options. This meant that employees had to pay tax on 
future gains in the year the option was granted, thus many believed it became too 
expensive to grant options (Ministry of Finance 2000). 
 
In 1999 employees received tax exemption when granting if the option benefit did 
not exceed NOK 600.000 p.a. and when it fulfilled certain other criteria. The same 
rules did not apply for publicly traded firms. In June 2000 the taxation exemption 
when issuing disappeared. Instead the gain when exercising or selling the option 
was taxed as income and should also be the base of payroll tax. The rule of 
transition for taxation on options for the fiscal years for 1996 until 2001 is 
described in the Norwegian Tax Law, cf. § 19-2 (5) (appendix 1).  
 
In 2002 the Government suggested that publicly traded firms would have to pay 
tax when exercising or selling options, instead of paying tax when granting them, 
cf. the Norwegian Tax Law § 5-14 (3) (appendix 1), when the underlying asset is 
an existing share, a right to subscribe for shares or a right to acquire shares 
(Ministry of Finance 2000). The general tax rule prevailing at present when 
exercising or selling an option, is stated in the Norwegian Tax Law cf. § 5-10, 
which refers to §5-14 (3) with regards to options (appendix 1). There have also 
been issued other regulations by the Government concerning the use of stock 
options, e.g. the “Active and Long-term Ownership” from 2006/2007. This 
regulation states that partly government-owned companies should not use options 
as incentive-based payment for managers and other employees. 
4.2 ”Active and Long-term Ownership” from the Norwegian Government  
The Norwegian Government released a government-ownership parliamentary 
report called “Eierskapsmeldingen” in St.meld 13 in 2006-2007, “Active and 
Long-term Ownership”. This report laid the standard for how the Government 
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should act relative to its ownership in partly government-owned companies and in 
our case, publicly traded firms. The report’s main statement is that the 
Government will play an active role in these companies and focus on industrial 
development with a long-term view on their investments. Through this statement 
the Government wants to contribute to a positive and stable development for the 
Norwegian economy and healthy corporate governance within these companies. 
 
It is important to consider the high ownership share the Norwegian Government 
has in several of the largest companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange. This 
obviously affects how these companies are governed. The “Active and Long-term 
Ownership” – report states that the Government has high expectations of the 
Board of Directors and the ambitions and performance of each company they have 
stakes in. Additionally, the compensation policy for the management and 
employees is affected by the company’s corporate governance and by the 
company’s respective boards. In appendix 2 the ownership shares in these 
companies are presented and in appendix 3 the market value relative to all the 
companies in our sample are shown.  
 
The report described above and an updated report from 2010-2011 state that 
options and similar option-based instruments should not be used in companies 
with government-owned shares. Even though the Government has different 
ownership stakes in companies listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange and not a 
majority vote in all general meetings, this statement sends a clear signal to these 
companies. This is a factor that might explain the declining trend of granted 
options in these publicly traded firms and the beginning of long-term incentive 
programs which will be reviewed below.  
4.3 Long-term incentive programs 
The Government released in 2006-2007 a report called “Active and Long-term 
Ownership” as mentioned above. Its objective was to change the practice of 
incentive pay. They did not find enough support for the use of stock options in 
government-owned companies and wanted to see an end to these types of 
incentives. They also wanted a general “cap” on how high incentive pay could be 
relative to fixed salary. This could also explain the entry of a new incentive 
program called “long-term incentive” (LTI) programs for government-owned 
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publicly traded firms. These types of programs are different from stock option 
programs because LTI-programs are needed with fewer shares than options and it 
is also a cheaper way to pay with generally lower accounting charges. Shares in an 
LTI-program will always have some value even though the share price drops 
significantly; hence the incentive share will always have some value. Options that 
are considerably out-of-the-money, on the other hand, will not be a good incentive 
because it is harder to receive any return from the incentive.  
 
An LTI-program can also be seen as more aligned with the interests of the 
shareholders and those involved in the program because it can be less challenging 
to reach the goals of the incentive program. In 2010-2011 the Norwegian 
Government again published a parliamentary report, St. meld no.13 “Active 
Ownership”, stating their opposition to stock options. They did however describe 
a share-based remuneration that is similar to the LTI-programs mentioned above. 
Here, the owner of the shares that have a binding period of minimum three years 
cannot sell the shares until the end of the binding period and this program can 
only be used in listed companies. Appendix 4 contains an overview of the partly 
government-owned companies and other companies that started using LTI-
programs between 2001 and 2012.  
 
Now that we have set the framework for our thesis  we will subsequently look at 
the methodology. 
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5. Methodology 
 
Our thesis is divided into two different analyses in terms of stock option 
compensation. First there are the graphical analyses and statistical tests of these 
analyses regarding the effect IFRS-2 has had on the number of stock options 
granted and outstanding in Norwegian companies. Then there are regression 
analyses of how options affect performance and vice versa.  
5.1 Estimation window  
We have chosen to look at the 50 biggest companies, based on market value, 
listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange as of December 31st 2012 in the period 
between 2001 and 2012. The time period is chosen to capture the effect of IFRS-2 
by analyzing pre- and post- 2005. These 50 companies account for a total of 
approximately 95% of the total market value on the Oslo Stock Exchange at this 
date. In terms of this we believe that our data will provide reasonable results. A 
list of the selected companies, which industries they operate in and their market 
shares are shown in appendix 3. The companies are divided into different 
subsamples depending on when they were listed on the stock exchange; details are 
given in the next section.  
5.2 IFRS-2 
Accounting regulations play an important role in how companies structure stock 
options for CEOs and other employees as well as their motivation of using such 
instruments (Murphy 2012). Thus, accounting regulations will be seen as an 
explanatory variable when changes in the compensation structure occur. The 
accounting regulations may affect whether or not companies see stock options 
given to management and employees, as an expensive way of compensating based 
on how it should be accounted for (Haugnes et al. 2011). An example from the US 
of why accounting economically should matter is the transition from the voluntary 
accounting rules called FAS123 before 2005 to FAS123R (equivalent to IFRS-2) 
in 2005, where it became mandatory to report the expenses of stock options on the 
accounting statement (Murphy 2012). Murphy (2012) also elaborates that option 
expensing leveled the field between stock and options from an accounting 
perspective in the US. The result of this was that the number of granted options to 
top executive and other employees was significantly reduced while the use of 
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restricted stock increased. IFRS-2 was initiated in 2005 and led to changes in how 
publicly traded companies in Norway had to report their compensation plans, see 
details in the section “Accounting Principles”.  The effect of IFRS-2 on stock 
options is analyzed by conducting graphs and running regressions of the number 
of stock options granted and outstanding pre-and post- 2005. 
5.3 Compensation and performance  
The linkage between compensation and performance has been studied 
comprehensively throughout the years and some of the theories and findings of 
other authors are discussed in the literature review and hypotheses sections. We 
will perform similar analyses as other authors; we analyze the linkage between 
options and performance by running different simple and multiple linear 
regressions. Multiple linear regressions attempt to model the relationship between 
several explanatory variables and a response variable by fitting a linear equation 
to observed data. The performance, compensation and control variables included 
are discussed in the next section. The Newey-West HAC method is used when 
running the statistical regressions in Eviews. The Newey-West produces 
consistent standard errors that corrects for both autocorrelation and 
heteroscedasticity that may be present in the regressions (Brooks 2008). As tested 
for below, we find autocorrelation in the majority of our regressions and this 
method will give more robust results. The Newly-West deflates the t-values to a 
more accurate level (Brooks 2008).   
5.4 Statistical testing of the regression models 
We perform different statistical tests of the regression model to determine its 
robustness (Brooks 2008). We check for multicollinearity, which means that at 
least two of the explanatory variables are highly correlated. If multicollinearity 
exists it does not reduce the predictive power of the model as a whole, but it may 
result in spurious results about individual predictors. In addition we have applied 
the Breuch-Pegan’s test to detect heteroscedasticity, meaning that there exist a 
collection of random variables in the data. This can lead to spurious significant 
results and thereby result in wrongly rejecting or accepting the models null 
hypotheses, which is a major concern when performing regressions in general 
(Brooks 2008). Heteroscedasticity and kurtosis are explained in the next section 
when discussing the descriptive statistics. In order to improve the robustness of 
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the statistical analyses it would be optimal to cluster the residuals of the variables 
on an industry level, which means allowing the error terms of the variables to 
correlate between the companies in the same industry. Due to resource limitations 
we are not been able to do this, but we will perform regression analysis on an 
industry level in order to capture industry fixed effects. In addition we have 
looked at the correlation between the residuals of our regression models based on 
industry (appendix 5). From these results it seems that there exists some 
correlation between the residuals of the companies within the same industry even 
without clustering the residuals of the models. 
 
Next we will perform diagnostic tests of the OLS estimators of our regression 
models and check for presence of multicollinearity.  
5.5 Linear regression (OLS-assumptions) 
Assumption 1: The error terms have zero mean.  
This assumption is fulfilled since we have a constant term in all of our regressions 
(Brooks 2008). If the constant term is left out, the consequences could be a 
negative R-squared, biased slope coefficients and meaningless R-squared/ 
adjusted R-squared. 
 
Assumption 2: Homoscedasticity. Breuch-Pegan test 
We have used Breusch-Pegan test instead of the White test to check for 
heteroscedasticity, since the White test is more suited for larger samples (Brooks 
2008). The results in section seven show no sign of heteroscedasticity except 
model 2b – “risk-adjusted return”. The consequence of heteroscedasticity is that 
the standard errors could be wrong and this could lose precision in the hypothesis 
testing (Brooks 2008). To deal with this issue we have used log variables which 
will be discussed in the next section and applied the Newey-West HAC method. 
 
Assumption 3: No autocorrelation 
The third (OLS) assumption states that the disturbance terms should be 
uncorrelated with one another over time (Brooks 2008). We have tested our main 
regressions from the analysis running the Durbin Watson test for first order 
autocorrelation. We find that the majority of our main regressions are affected by 
positive autocorrelation (appendix 6). The result of this could be incorrect 
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inference of the variables in the regression, but still the coefficients will be 
unbiased (Brooks 2008). Positive autocorrelation will give OLS standard errors to 
be biased downward relative to the true value standard errors and the OLS will 
understate their true variability (Brooks 2008). Further it is possible to check for 
higher levels of autocorrelation using the Breusch-Godfrey test. We test for 
second order autocorrelation and receive the same conclusions of autocorrelation 
as with Durbin Watson test. In this study we use yearly data because stock options 
are only given once a year and this might cause the issue. The small sample size 
may also be a reason for the presence of autocorrelation. 
 
Assumption 4: Non-stochastic explanatory variables 
There should be no correlation between the residuals and the explanatory 
variables (Brooks 2008).  
 
Assumption 5: The residuals follow a normal distribution 
The purpose of this assumption is to enable normal inference and since our 
sample size is fairly small we need a test to make sure this assumption is not 
violated. As can be seen from appendix 7, the residuals follow a normal 
distribution meaning the assumption is not violated. 
 
Multicollinearity:  
As mentioned above we have tested for multicollinearity to check if it exists in 
our regressions. We have run the variance inflation factor (VIF) test to measure 
the multicollinearity among the explanatory variables in the regressions. Since 
none of them exceed a high value (not above ten) and the R-squared in every 
regression is not significantly high, we do not regard multicollinearity as a 
problem. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Master thesis Share-based payment and IFRS-2 02.09.2013 
Page 22 
6. Data 
 
This section contains a description of the data and the data collection. The 
compensation data and company specific information regarding IFRS-2 are 
retrieved from companies’ annual reports, sector and market value is collected 
from the Oslo Stock Exchange webpage and all other data are obtained from the 
software Datastream.  
6.1 Data collection 
The compensation data consist of CEO salary, companies’ total salary, CEOs’ 
granted stock options and year-end outstanding stock options, management year-
end outstanding stock options and companies’ total granted stock options and 
year-end outstanding stock options. All of this data is manually collected from 
companies’ annual reports, a total of 600 reports, and may therefore consist of 
typing errors. This could weaken our results, however by having invested months 
in this process we hope to have a dataset that minimizes such errors.  
 
The company specific information regarding IFRS-2 from the annual reports is 
information on how companies implemented the new regulation, the difference in 
their accounting policy because of it and if provided, their opinions on it. Some 
companies, mainly the ones using stock options, provide detailed information on 
all of these aspects, while some barely mention IFRS-2 at all.  
 
The Oslo Stock Exchange webpage provide specifications on which sectors the 
different companies operate in, allowing us to perform analyses on industry level. 
Both in terms of IFRS-2 and on the regressions relative to performance, analyses 
on industry-level are performed to consider industry fixed effects.  
 
All other data, which are obtained from Datastream, are yearly numbers based on 
the last day of each year. A description of the variables collected from Datastream 
that are included in the regressions is presented below.  
6.2 Variables 
The use of stock options is analyzed by performing several simple and multiple 
regressions. The variables included in these analyses are divided into three 
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categories, as Adelaziz et. al. (2011) did in their analysis of compensation and 
performance on French companies: compensation variables, performance 
variables and control variables. The descriptive statistics of the variables are 
presented at the end of this section.  
Compensation variables 
- Total salary: companies’ salary excluding pension costs etc.  
- CEO salary and bonus: the majority of the companies report their CEOs’ 
salary and bonus as one post without specification of what it includes. 
Therefore it is not possible for us to say anything about the salary without 
the bonus and furthermore nothing about what the bonus includes.  
- Total outstanding options. 
- Total outstanding options management: here management includes both 
the board of directors and the executive management.  
- Total outstanding options CEO. 
- Total granted options. 
- Total granted options CEO. 
Performance variables 
We have included several performance measures in order to achieve more 
conclusive results; all of them are commonly used as measures of performance in 
literature.  Return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) are measures of 
accounting performance, while companies’ risk-adjusted return is the main 
performance variable in terms of equity compensation in general.  
- ROA: operating income divided by total assets.  
- ROE: net income divided by total equity.  
- Risk-adjusted return / Sharpe Ratio: log daily returns of each firms’ 
annualized minus log risk free rate annualized, divided by the standard 
deviation*√252. The risk free rate is a ten-year Norwegian Government 
bond. The standard deviation is the standard deviation of the log return 
times the square root of 252 business days of each year. In terms of 
compensation, this is our main performance variable.  
Control variables 
The control variables are included in the analyses to control for firm size, growth 
opportunities and the companies’ financial risk.  
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- Size: measured by the logarithm of total assets. The reasoning behind 
controlling for companies’ size is that size is seen as a major determinant 
of executive compensation and compensation in general. Bigger 
companies usually have greater internal funds and can more easily 
generate external funding that allows them to take on more projects and 
generate higher profits. In addition they have economies of scale that 
allows them to benefit from higher performance. In terms of 
compensation, especially when looking at number of stock options granted 
or outstanding, it is important to control for the size of the firm because 
bigger companies have the resources to grant a higher number than smaller 
companies.  
- Price to book value (PTBV): risk-adjusted return divided by the book 
value of share. We have chosen the PTBV to control for the companies’ 
growth opportunities. Some use this variable as a measure of performance 
however it can also be an indicator of growth within a company.  
- Debt ratio: total debt divided by total assets. This variable controls for 
creditors’ influence on company performance.  
6.3 IFRS-2 
To analyze the effects on the use of stock options in terms of IFRS-2, we have 
conducted graphs showing the granted and end-year outstanding stock options 
pre- and post- 2005 and a regression analysis on the same data. The numbers of 
options are adjusted to account for firm size.  
6.4 Subsamples 
The companies in our total sample were listed on the stock exchange in different 
years; hence when performing the analysis we have focused on the companies that 
existed on the exchange the entire period from 2001 to present. An alternative 
would be to create subsamples with different timeframes as companies were 
listed, however by e.g. creating a subsample with the companies that existed 
between 2002-2012 would only increase the sample with two companies, hence it 
does not significantly improve our analyses. By creating subsamples we get 27 
companies in the period 2001-2012, 29 companies in the period 2002-2012 and 
finally 34 companies between 2004 and 2012. Having chosen the period from 
2004 to 2012 would increase the number of companies analyzed from 27 to 34, 
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but we would not be able to capture the effect of IFRS-2. Even though companies 
did not have to implement the new regulations until 2005, they were aware of it 
years before and may have started preparing for it.   
 
The relatively small sample is also justified by the availability of stock option data 
in the companies’ annual reports, e.g. we had to remove two companies 
completely due to lack of available information. Frontline and Stolt-Nielsen did 
not provide necessary information within their annual reports, which we are 
assuming is because they are based abroad where there are different requirements. 
Additionally, the Oslo Stock Exchange and the Norwegian market is small 
compared to other countries’ stock exchanges’ and financial markets so 
performing studies on Norwegian companies instead of e.g. US companies 
provide less available data and information.  Since the Norwegian market is small, 
the 27 companies in our main time period constitute almost 77% of the market 
value on Oslo Stock Exchange as of December 31st 2012, which makes the data 
sufficient to provide valid results (appendix 3). The remaining 14 companies that 
were listed in 2005 or later are of less interest since IFRS-2 was initiated in 2005. 
A viable alternative would be to look at all companies that at some point in these 
12 years was listed on the exchange, however given time and resource constraints 
we are not able to do this.  
 
The companies vary significantly in terms of size and to account for this we have 
normalized the data by size, in our case, the logarithm of the companies’ total 
assets. We do this in order to conduct a notionally common scale.  
6.5 Descriptive statistics 
The descriptive statistics from the dataset described above is viewed at the end of 
this section in table 1. The table is divided into three sections with regards to the 
variable groups of compensation, performance and control variables. 
 
The compensation variables are those interesting to investigate in this matter, and 
we will look further into the CEO salary and bonus variables. The mean salary 
and bonus for CEOs is NOK 4.311.082. These two variables are not separated 
because a majority of the companies only report them together, as mentioned 
earlier. A graph of the CEO salary can be seen in appendix 8. The minimum 
Master thesis Share-based payment and IFRS-2 02.09.2013 
Page 26 
salary and bonus is zero and one example of this is the CEO in Norwegian Air 
Shuttle. He only receives shares as remuneration some years in our dataset. The 
maximum salary and bonus equals to NOK 20, 6 million for CEOs.  
 
The skewness measures to which degree a distribution is symmetric about its 
mean value. Optimally the distribution being observed should have the same 
probability of observing values above or below the mean. The skewed distribution 
will have longer tails, while a normal distribution is symmetric about its mean 
(Brooks 2008). From our results we can see that the majority of the variables 
below have positive skewness, which means that the mean is higher than the 
median. The variable CEO salary and bonus illustrate this well, as there will be 
more companies that give the CEO a higher salary and bonus than the median 
company (appendix 9).  
 
The kurtosis measures the amount of volume in the tails. In a normal distribution 
the coefficients of kurtosis have the value of three and are called mesokurtic. A 
leptokurtic distribution has the value of one and has a fatter tail and a higher peak 
at its mean than a normal distribution variable. The last type of kurtosis is called 
platykurtic distribution. It has a less peak to the mean, and has more of the 
distribution in the shoulders and thinner tails (Brooks 2008). From our result we 
can see that most of the variables have values that lie within the boundary of being 
normal distributed, while some variables have extreme values. This may be due to 
the large differences between companies in our dataset e.g. company size, and this 
will affect our results (appendix 9).  
 
Looking at the histograms in appendix 9, where the most important variables are 
included, we see that all variables are fairly normal distributed (tend to be 
somewhat negatively skewed) except the stock price variable (log year-end stock 
price). This variable is not included in any of the above regressions, but is 
included in appendix 9 to illustrate why we use risk-adjusted return and not stock 
price as a performance variable. The risk-adjusted return variable follows a 
normal distribution, while the stock price variable is positively skewed and 
leptokurtic. This is one of the reasons why we use risk-adjusted return and 
hopefully this may also lead to more proper results when running the regressions.  
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The control variables and performance variables were thoroughly described above 
and will be discussed further in the next section. 
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Table 1 - Descriptive Statistics 
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7. Results 
7.1 Part 1: IFRS and compensation 
The results from our collected data are reviewed below in different types of 
graphs. We believe that the most illustrating graphs of the development of the use 
of stock options are those represented with the number of granted options and the 
total options outstanding for CEOs, management and employees. We will try to 
find reasoning behind our hypothesis concerning Government legislations by 
looking at the development in the estimated timeframe.  
 
Looking at the level of granted options to CEOs, the graph show a relatively 
stable level until 2005 when IFRS-2 became effective. In 2005, graph 1 shows a 
peak in granting of options for CEOs and employees. The following year a drop in 
the number of options granted is quite clear. This drop supports our hypotheses 
that a change in government legislations leads to a change in the use of options. 
Reviewing annual reports, some firms are straightforward in their opinion of the 
new accounting legislation; especially one comment is worth noting from Nordic 
Semiconductor, see section 3.4. In addition, six other companies chose to 
terminate their stock option program as a result of the new IFRS-regulations. 
They find it too challenging to continue using options as an incentive instrument 
for their management and employees.  
 
Graph 1- Granted Options from 2001 to 2012 
For granted options in total it looks to be a significant decrease from 2002 to 2003 
and one could argue that maybe the companies were aware of the new regulation 
at this point. Additionally, as mentioned in section 3.4 the IFRS-2 was not 
applicable to stock options granted before November 7th 2002 and this may be a 
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reason for the drop between 2002 and 2003. Granting of options had a peak in 
2005, and it seems like firms significantly decreased the granting of options, at 
least compared to the previous pace, when the IFRS-2 became effective in 2005. 
Statistical analysis with the introduction of IFRS-2 as an explanatory endogenous 
variable that receives the value 1 in 2005 and 0 otherwise shows that for granted 
options to the CEO the variable IFRS-2 is positive but not statistically significant 
as the significance level is 0.296. This implies that the change in options granted 
to CEO’s is with a 29.6 % probability not due to the introduction of IFRS-2. We 
therefore keep the null hypotheses, as we cannot prove the effects of IFRS2 on 
compensation. Previous studies by Damodaran (2005) among others find that 
companies that issue options to executives usually issue them every year. With the 
granting of options to CEOs experiencing a drop after 2005, this could imply that 
something is causing companies to suddenly stop issuing options, which may be 
the new regulation. The analysis for the total number of options granted shows 
that the variable capturing the introduction of IFRS-2 is negative but again 
statistically insignificant giving the same conclusion as for CEO grants however 
with a probability of 87.9 %. It should be emphasized that the p-value of the 
models exceed 0.05, meaning that there is a high probability that other factors are 
affecting the number of options granted to both CEOs and in total. See appendix 
10 for details.  
 
The level of options outstanding, shown in graph 2, did not change significantly, 
although we can see a minor decrease in level options outstanding between 2004 
until 2006. The reason may be that for the level of options the firms granted until 
2005 and IFRS-2, the vesting period remained even after the new regulations took 
effect, so that the options are not exercised until several years after 2005. From 
the statistical tests presented below graph 2, one can see that the variable for the 
introduction of IFRS-2 is negative and significant at the 5%-level, implying that 
the decrease in the number of options outstanding to employees excess of 
management is due to the application of the new regulation. This is consistent 
with our hypothesis, HA,1 in section 1, that a change in Government legislations 
leads to change in the use of stock options and we therefore reject the null 
hypotheses. As for management the variable IFRS-2 is not significant. It seems 
that the number of options outstanding for the management was not affected by 
the implementation of IFRS-2. These results are also presented below the graph. 
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As argued earlier, companies were aware of IFRS-2 before 2005 so that the 
change in the levels of outstanding options before 2005 may have been caused by 
adapting to the forthcoming regulation. 
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Graph 2 - Outstanding Options from 2001 to 2012 !"#$!%&!!"#$%&!!'! = !!! + !!!IFRS2! !+ !!!PTBV! !+ !!!SIZE! !+ !!!DEBT!RATIO! !+!!RISK!ADJ!RETURN!! + !ε! , !ℎ!"!!!!!"#$%&!!"#$!!"#!!!!"!!ℎ!!!"#$%&$'#   
R Square Adjusted R Square S.E. of regression F-statistic Prob(F-statistic)
0.154332 0.116579 1.587616 4.087935 0.001905***
Model Coefficient Std. Error t-statistics Sig.
(Constant) 9.295019 2.118419 4.387715 0.0000
IFRS 2 -0.916794 0.399302 -2.295990 0.0235**
PTBV 0.033510 0.062896 0.532784 0.5952
SIZE 0.302895 0.146082 2.073454 0.0404**
DEBT RATIO -0.005387 0.018316 -0.294084 0.7692
RISK ADJ RETURN -0.226067 0.133767 -1.690003 0.0938*
***,**, and * denote a significane level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Coefficients
Model Summary
 
Table 2 - Options Employees from 2001 to 2012 
 !"#$!%&! "#"$%!%#&! = !!! + !!!IFRS2! !+ !!!PTBV! !+ !!!SIZE! !+ !!!DEBT!RATIO! !+!!RISK!ADJ!RETURN!! + !ε! , !ℎ!"!!!!!"#$%&!!"#$!!"#!!!!"!!ℎ!!!"#$%&$'#   
R Square Adjusted R Square S.E. of regression F-statistic Prob(F-statistic)
0.045212 0.008205 1.775564 1.221705 0.302623
Model Coefficient Std. Error t-statistics Sig.
(Constant) 15.40520 2.084502 7.390351 0.0000
IFRS 2 -0.386120 0.607396 -0.635698 0.5261
PTBV 0.043085 0.056606 0.761137 0.4480
SIZE -0.138989 0.127123 -1.093341 0.2763
DEBT RATIO -0.004634 0.009008 -0.514439 0.6078
RISK ADJ RETURN -0.114161 0.147701 -0.772917 0.4410
***,**, and * denote a significane level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Coefficients
Model Summary
 
Table 3 - Options Management from 2001 to 2012 
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The highest peak of outstanding options and granted options after the 
implementation of IFRS-2 was in 2009. This may be due to the new regulations 
issued by the Norwegian Government mentioned above, where partly 
government-owned companies in our database were highly recommended to stop 
using options-programs and start using LTI-programs instead. The upward trend 
from 2005 to 2009 might have been caused by companies not implementing the 
new accounting regulation at once. Companies may have needed to train staff first 
in order to incorporate the new system and understand if the use of options with 
the new legislating still was an economically good idea for the different 
companies. In addition, companies may have granted stock options with a vesting 
period over many years, and IFRS-2 did not apply to the options granted before 
November 7th 2002. 
 
Other graphs we find interesting, displayed below, are options outstanding to 
CEOs, options outstanding to management and total options outstanding, all 
divided by industries. The financial and IT industry especially reveal a decrease in 
options used by firms in our dataset in 2005. In the financial industry which 
accounts for 10% of the companies in our sample options to management and 
employees stop after 2004. The trend is also similar for the IT industry in graph 3, 
accounting for 8% of the companies in our sample. Here, options to every 
employee in the organization in the IT industry drop significantly and stay at a 
lower level after 2005.  
 
 
 
Graph 3 - Options in the IT industry from 2001 to 2012 
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Graph 4 - Options in the Financial industry from 2001 to 2012 
 
Statistical analyses for the different industries are shown in appendix 10. For the 
IT industry the introduction of IFRS-2 is not significant, however neither is the 
model, thereby we cannot conclude whether the new regulation affected the 
options outstanding for the companies in this industry. The same is found for the 
financial sector, see graph 4.   
 
The Energy industry, shown in graph 5, does not give us the same clear view 
about the discontinuing of using stock options after IFRS-2. This might be 
because this industry, more than others, approves and implements the new 
accounting legislation. We assume that these companies are working more 
directly towards an international market and that this influences them to continue 
using share-based payment as incentive payment. It is also reasonable to assume 
that these firms are not bound by any domestic knowledge and that the companies 
can attract foreign skilled employees by offering incentive payment contracts. 
From the statistical analysis in appendix 10, the results are the same as for other 
industries; it seems as the change in stock options is not affected by the new 
regulation, but the variable capturing the implementation of IFRS-2 is not 
significant and the model has a p-value that exceeds 0.05. At the industry level we 
cannot state with certainty that the change in options outstanding is affected by the 
new regulation, hence keeping H0,1. 
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Other explanations could be, as we see a drop in stock options around 2007, that 
there is a delayed response to IFRS-2 or that the financial crisis affected the use of 
stock options. Murphy (2012) found in his studies on US companies that during 
every recession stock option grants decrease, which could also be the case for the 
companies in Norway. Even though Norway was not among the countries that 
were harmed the most by the financial crisis, many companies were affected to 
some extent. None of these explanations can be stated with certainty as we have 
not tested with IFRS-2 as an exogenous variable in years after 2005, and the 
recession-theory has not been tested in this thesis. However, they are both fair 
assumptions. 
 
 
Graph 5 - Options in the Energy industry from 2001 to 2012 
 
The majority of the total outstanding options are given to the employees according 
to graph 2. This graph indicates that low-rank employee options are affected more 
than management and CEO options, particularly when looking at year 2004 and 
2005. Looking at the statistics, we can see that the overall model in graph 2 for 
“options management” is not significant while the overall model for “options 
employees” is significant at a 1%-level. This may indicate that the number of 
options given to employees is more statistically robust.  
 
One explanation can be the cost for firms at granting options when the entry of 
IFRS-2 for options became effective in 2005 (Murphy 2012). We show in graph 1 
and 2 above that higher amount of options are usually given to lower level 
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employees in total numbers than to management and CEOs and this could be a 
matter of increased costs for firms.  
 
Firms are granting options to low-level employees instead of cash compensation 
when the firm is facing financial constraints (Core and Guay 2001). Graph 1 
indicates that the total amount of options granted is increasing after the financial 
crisis in 2007. Furthermore it is argued that when employees are irrationally 
optimistic about the performance of the company, it will be optimal to grant 
options instead of cash (Oyer and Schaefer (2005) and Bergman and Jenter 
(2007)). Regarding this argument we can assume that employees are less informed 
about the firm’s financial state than its management and CEO.  
 
We find it interesting to discuss the option compensation contracts for CEOs and 
top management versus low-rank employees. CEOs and top management would 
probably have more flexibility and bargaining power in terms of negotiating job 
descriptions than low-rank employees with standardized contracts applicable to 
many employees. CEOs and top management have more knowledge in the overall 
state of the company than low-rank employees and will be more informed when 
negotiating terms of the contract.  
 
In addition there is also a difference between investors and employees in terms of 
financial leverage. Increased financial leverage increases the volatility of the 
company’s stock price, which is good news for an investor who in theory is well 
diversified. An undiversified employee is overinvested in the company when 
holding stock options and cannot sell these options immediately meaning that 
increased volatility of the stock price might be bad news due to the increased risk. 
Investors might try to convince the company to take on more debt in order to 
increase the volatility of the stock. For the overall employees this means that the 
options with a greater probability end up out-of-the-money. With this increased 
risk the stock options given to employees with the intention of motivating and 
enhancing their performance might not work. This is one of the concerns 
companies and its employees have to consider before entering a stock option 
program. LTI-programs, discussed in section 4, do not have this challenge to the 
same extent. 
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7.2 Part 2: Compensation and performance  
The second part of our thesis concerns the relationship between stock options and 
performance. To analyze this we have performed several multiple regressions and 
lagged simple regressions. The most important results are presented below, while 
the remaining is shown in appendix 11.   
 
The regressions are divided into three categories; (1) multiple linear regression 
where compensation is regressed on performance variables, (2) multiple linear 
regression where performance (risk-adjusted return) is regressed on compensation 
variables and (3) simple linear regressions in which current compensation is based 
upon last periods risk-adjusted return, and opposite.  
 
(1) Compensation and performance. Dependent variable: compensation. 
First total outstanding options, which is estimated to account for size, is measured 
against different performance variables and the control variables for growth 
(PTBV), company size (SIZE) and creditors influence on company performance 
(DEBTRATIO). The regression equation is: 
 
(1a)  !"!#$! "#$!%&!! = !!! + !!!ROE! !+ !!!SIZE! !+ !!!PTBV! !+ !!!DEBT!RATIO! !+ !!!ROA!! +!!RISK!ADJ!RETURN!! + !!DIVIDEND!PER!SHARE!! + !ε! ,!ℎ!"!!!!!"#$%&!!"#$!!"#!!!!"!!ℎ!!!"#$%&$'#  
 
The results displayed in table 4 show that the model as a whole is significant at a 
1%-level, indicated by a low p-value, however not all of the explanatory variables 
are significant independently. Dividend per share is significantly different from 
zero at a 1%-level and debt ratio and size is significant at a 5%- and 10%-level, 
meaning that these variables explain the variance in the number of options with a 
high probability. Their coefficients are -0.314, -0.023 and 0.273 respectively. 
Company size is positively related to the number of options, which is consistent 
with previous studies e.g. Baker and Hall (2004) showing that bigger companies 
have greater opportunities to have a higher number of options within the 
company. Between options and companies’ debt ratio and dividend per share there 
exists a negative relationship, e.g. if the dividend per share increases with one 
unit, this means that the number of options will decrease with 0.314. This 
relationship does not support our hypothesis of a positive relationship between 
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compensation and performance, section 1, so in this case we keep the null 
hypothesis. There is no significant relationship with risk-adjusted return and 
compensation, which is inconsistent with previous studies and agency theory, 
however it is consistent with the managerial power theory. This theory states that 
there exists no significant relationship between performance and compensation 
and that compensation is a result of managerial power and not an incentive-based 
contract. The R-squared is 20.4%, indicating that the explanatory variables are 
able to explain approximately 20% of the variance in total outstanding options. 
 
R Square Adjusted R Square S.E. of regression F-statistic Prob(F-statistic)
0.204214 0.165530 1.487764 5.279022 0.000022***
Model Coefficient Std. Error t-statistics Sig.
(Constant) 10.86559 2.560471 4.243588 0.0000
ROE 0.028570 0.019074 1.497827 0.1364
SIZE 0.273905 0.162516 1.685404 0.0941*
PTBV 0.028248 0.044734 0.631458 0.5287
DEBT RATIO -0.023050 0.011197 -2.058646 0.0413**
ROA -0.942870 1.406564 -0.670336 0.5037
RISK ADJ RETURN -0.146762 0.109063 -1.345663 0.1805
DIVIDEND PER SHARE -0.314884 0.094454 -3.333728 0.0011***
***,**, and * denote a significane level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Coefficients
Model Summary
 
Table 4 - Total Options from 2001 to 2012 
 
The second regression on compensation is based on the number of options granted 
to the CEO, again estimated to account for size. The performance- and control 
variables are the same. The regression equation is: 
 
(1b)  !"#!!"#$%&'! "#$!%&!! = !!! + !!!ROE! !+ !!!SIZE! !+ !!!PTBV! !+ !!!DEBT!RATIO! !+!!!ROA!! + !!RISK!ADJ!RETURN!! + !!DIVIDEND!PER!SHARE!! + !ε! ,!ℎ!"!!!!!"#$%&!!"#$!!"#!!!!"!!ℎ!!!"#$%&$'#  
 
The model displayed in table 5 has a p-value of 0.28 meaning that there is a 
probability all of the coefficients are zero and therefore the model cannot capture 
whether or not the explanatory variables are able to explain the variance in the 
number of stock options granted to the CEO. Thus, we cannot conclude about the 
relationship between granted options to the CEO and performance. 
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R Square Adjusted R Square S.E. of regression F-statistic Prob(F-statistic)
0.121588 0.025512 1.678954 1.265541 0.281577
Model Coefficient Std. Error t-statistics Sig.
(Constant) 11.43445 2.438388 4.689349 0.0000
ROE -0.154349 0.585865 -0.263455 0.7930
SIZE 0.006607 0.138731 0.047628 0.9622
PTBV 0.031638 0.085352 0.370682 0.7121
DEBT RATIO 0.011286 0.017352 0.650392 0.5178
ROA -0.600331 2.439708 -0.246067 0.8064
RISK ADJ RETURN 0.118484 0.173288 0.683741 0.4966
DIVIDEND PER SHARE -0.234458 0.079798 -2.938157 0.0046**
***,**, and * denote a significane level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Coefficients
Model Summary
 
Table 5 - CEO granted options from 2001 to 2012 
 
 (2) Compensation and risk-adjusted return. Dependent variable: performance 
(risk-adjusted return). 
The first regression with risk-adjusted return as the dependent variable is 
connected to the companies’ total outstanding and granted options and total 
salary, while the second one is connected to the CEOs’ outstanding and granted 
options and CEO salary. The control variables are included in both. The first 
regression equation is: 
 
(2a) !"#$!!"#!!"#$!%!! = !!! + !!!DEBT!RATIO! !+ !!!PTBV! !+ !!!SIZE! !+!!!TOTAL!OPTIONS! !+ !!!GRANTED!OPTIONS! + !!TOTAL!SALARY!! + !ε! ,!ℎ!"!!!!!"#$%&!!"#$!!"#!!!!"!!ℎ!!!"#$%&$'#  
 
The model displayed in table 6 has a low p-value and four of the explanatory 
variables are significantly different from zero at a 10%-level or better. Growth, 
measured by the price to book value, and company size are not significant and 
positively related to the risk adjusted return, while there is a significant negative 
relationship between the risk-adjusted return and the companies’ debt ratio. The 
compensation variables except for companies’ total salary are all insignificant. 
Salary is significant and negatively related to the risk-adjusted return, which does 
not support our hypothesis of a positive relationship between compensation and 
performance. In terms of salary we therefore keep the null hypothesis. 
Furthermore, in contrast to our hypotheses our analysis indicates a negative 
relationship. For the other compensation variables we are not able to state 
anything about their relationship with performance as they are insignificant. The 
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model is able to capture almost 22% of the variance in the risk-adjusted return, 
measured by R-squared. 
 
R Square Adjusted R Square S.E. of regression F-statistic Prob(F-statistic)
0.272542 0.219313 1.116115 5.120207 0.000164***
Model Coefficient Std. Error t-statistics Sig.
(Constant) -1.592910 1.694543 -0.940023 0.3500
DEBT RATIO -0.015300 0.007362 -2.078256 0.0408**
PTBV 0.214070 0.042760 5.006360 0.0000***
SIZE 0.306482 0.090058 3.403163 0.0010***
LOG TOTAL OPTIONS 0.061704 0.113906 0.541708 0.5895
LOG GRANTED OPTIONS -0.082549 0.109984 -0.750554 0.4551
LOG TOTAL SALARY -0.154542 0.083483 -1.851173 0.0677*
***,**, and * denote a significane level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Coefficients
Model Summary
 
Table 6 – Risk-adjusted return from 2001 to 2012 
The second regression regards CEO compensation with the following regression 
equation:  
 
(2b)  !"#$!!"#!!"#$!%!! = !!! + !!!DEBT!RATIO! !+ !!!PTBV! !+ !!!SIZE! !+!!!CEO!SALARY! !+ !!!CEO!OPTIONS! + !!CEO!GRANTED!OPTIONS!! + !ε! ,!ℎ!"!!!!!"#$%&!!"#$!!"#!!!!"!!ℎ!!!"#$%&$'#  
 
The model displayed in table 7 has an R-squared of 0.343 which means that 
approximately 34% of the variance in the risk-adjusted return can be explained by 
the compensation- and control variables included in the model. Three control 
variables and total options outstanding to the CEO are significantly different from 
zero.  In this model, CEO granted options are positively related to the risk-
adjusted return which supports our hypothesis; however it is not significant, 
meaning that there is a probability that a negative relationship exists thereby 
inconsistent with the hypothesis. Options outstanding to the CEO are negatively 
related to performance in this case and significant at a 10%-level. This is 
inconsistent with our alternative hypothesis and we therefore keep the null 
hypothesis. 
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R Square Adjusted R Square S.E. of regression F-statistic Prob(F-statistic)
0.343065 0.280500 1.112968 5.483326 0.000129***
Model Coefficient Std. Error t-statistics Sig.
(Constant) -4.439949 3.707764 -1.197474 0.2356
DEBTRATIO -0.022443 0.008083 -2.776566 0.0072***
PTBV 0.215080 0.057818 3.719959 0.0004***
SIZE 0.230213 0.092564 2.487057 0.0155**
LOG CEO SALARY 0.106467 0.272935 0.390080 0.6978
LOG CEO OPTIONS -0.281600 0.158325 -1.778621 0.0801*
LOG CEO GRANTED OPTIONS 0.236854 0.148108 1.599203 0.1148
***,**, and * denote a significane level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Coefficients
Model Summary
 
Table 7 – Risk-adjusted return and CEO from 2001 to 2012 
 
 (3) Granted options and risk-adjusted return.  Lagged.  
In addition to performing analysis based on compensation and performance from 
2001 to 2012, we want to look at how the previous year’s granted options affects 
the current year’s risk-adjusted return, and opposite. This is to account for a 
potential delayed effect on the return by the number of options granted. The 
regression equation is: 
 
(3a)  !"#$!!"#!!"#$!%! = !!! + !!!GRANTED!OPTIONS!!!! !+ !ε! ,!ℎ!"!!!!!"#$%&!!"#$!!"#!!!!"!!ℎ!!!"#$%&!"#  
 
The model displayed in table 8 is insignificant with a significance level of 0.63. 
This means that there is a 63% probability that last year’s granting of options does 
not affect this year’s risk-adjusted return. The variables are positively related 
which means that if the company issues more options the company’s risk-adjusted 
return increases, which are consistent with the intention of the management to 
grant options in the first place. When issuing stock options, a company hopes to 
motivate employees and retain them, which may work well; however, the hope is 
that this motivation also leads to an increase in company performance. This 
relationship supports our hypothesis that there is a positive relationship between 
performance and compensation. The relationship is not significantly different 
from zero, so we cannot state the relationship with certainty. We therefore keep 
the null hypothesis stating that compensation does not influence performance, as 
we cannot prove otherwise. 
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R Square Adjusted R Square S.E. of regression F-statistic Prob(F-statistic)
0.002557 -0.008404 1.300456 0.233269 0.630271
Model Coefficient Std. Error t-statistics Sig.
(Constant) -0.413012 1.305282 -0.316416 0.7524
LOG GRANTED OPTIONS (t-1) 0.047297 0.095094 0.497365 0.6201
***,**, and * denote a significane level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Coefficients
Model Summary
 
Table 8 - Risk-adjusted return 
We also checked for the inverse relationship, namely how the performance of the 
company affects the following year’s number of granted options. The regression 
equation is: 
  
(3b)  GRANTED!OPTIONS! = !!! + !!!!!"#$!!"#!!"#$!%!!! !+ !ε! ,!ℎ!"!!!!!"#$%&!!"#$!!"#!!!!"!!ℎ!!!"#$%&!"#  
 
As can be seen in table 9, there is a positive relationship which indicates that if the 
risk-adjusted return has increased one year, the company issues more options to 
its employees the following year. This might be so because the company sees an 
increased performance by having issued stock options to its employees previously 
and thereby continue granting options hoping to increase performance further. The 
positive relationship supports our hypothesis, as presented in section 1. However 
the model is not significant so we cannot state the relationship between last year’s 
return and this year’s option grants with certainty. The model has an R-squared of 
0.000051 so the return one year explains only 0.005% of the variance in the stock 
option grants the following year. The model has a significance level of 0.945 
meaning that there is a 94.5% probability that last year’s performance do not 
affect this year’s granted options and we therefore keep the null hypothesis. 
 
R Square Adjusted R Square S.E. of regression F-statistic Prob(F-statistic)
0.000051 -0.010937 1.392072 0.004639 0.945847
Model Coefficient Std. Error t-statistics Sig.
(Constant) 13.22704 0.214094 61.78143 0.0000
RISK ADJ RETURN (t-1) 0.008519 0.120756 0.070550 0.9439
***,**, and * denote a significane level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Coefficients
Model Summary
 
Table 9 - Granted Options 
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7.3 Summary of findings 
One finding is that IFRS-2 led to a decrease in the number of stock options, which 
is consistent with findings by Murphy (2012) on US companies that reduced their 
grants when the regulation APB Opinion 25 was introduced. However even 
though many companies decreased the number of options due to the new 
regulation, many did not stop using incentive-based payment, some just shifted to 
LTI-programs and other types of remuneration. From part 1 the majority of the 
results are insignificant, therefore an overall conclusion regarding our first two 
hypotheses is to keep H0,1 and H0,2. From part 2 we find that the relationship 
between stock options and performance is negative. This is inconsistent with 
agency theory that shareholders and employees’ interests are aligned. It is also 
inconsistent with findings by Abdelaziz et. al. (2011); they find that performance 
and stock options in French companies are positively related; however, they use 
stock price as their performance measure while we use risk-adjusted return. When 
we performed our analysis with stock price as performance measure, we got the 
same results - a significant positive relationship. Our sample sizes were 
approximately the same. The negative relationship results may still be due to the 
small sample size and it could also be that a positive relationship would be found 
on other performance measures, e.g. stock price. The findings of no relationship 
between compensation and performance are consistent with the managerial power 
theory, which states that there exists no significant relationship between 
compensation and performance and that compensation is only a result of 
managerial power and not performance. The multiple insignificant results in 
general might also be due to our small sample size, so by increasing the number of 
companies in our study, the results might have been both supporting our 
hypotheses and significant.  
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8. Summary and conclusion 
 
In this two-part thesis stock options relative to both IFRS-2 and performance were 
analyzed. The objective of the thesis was to examine what influences the use of 
option-based remuneration in Norwegian companies listed on the Oslo Stock 
Exchange with a focus on IFRS-2 and performance variables (mainly the 
companies’ risk-adjusted returns).  
 
The sample in this paper consisted of the 50 biggest companies based on market 
value, but after revising due to lack of available information and which companies 
existed during our analysis period from 2001 to 2012, the final sample consists of 
27 companies. These companies account for 77% of the stock exchange, again 
based on market value. The full analysis is based on 324 observations. Part one of 
the analyses concerning the number of stock options granted and outstanding to 
CEOs and employees before and after the introduction of IFRS-2 in 2005, are 
conducted graphically and the analyses are tested statistically. These analyses are 
performed on the total sample and on industry-level. In the second part we 
analyze the relationship between compensation and performance by running 
simple and multiple regressions.  
 
The first-part analyses concerning stock options and IFRS-2 seeks to answer the 
hypothesis of whether or not government legislations affect the use of options as 
remuneration in Norwegian companies. The results show that the number of stock 
options decreased after the introduction of IFRS-2, consistent with the studies of 
Murphy (2012) on the legislation APB Opinion 25 in the US that led to a decrease 
in stock option grants. The analyses at industry-level showed that, e.g. in the 
finance and IT sector the number of stock options decreased after 2005. However, 
in the energy sector the use of options remained fairly the same until 2007. This 
might be a delayed effect of IFRS-2 implementation in 2005, or it may have 
nothing to do with IFRS-2 at all. Murphy (2012) finds that during every recession, 
the number of stock option grants decreases in the US, hence this might also have 
been the case for the energy companies in Norway during the financial crisis that 
started in 2007. Neither of these explanations can be stated with certainty since 
the analyses with IFRS-2 as an exogenous variable provide insignificant results 
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except in one case and we have not tested the recession-theory. Still we believe 
they are fair assumptions.  
 
The second part of the analyses identifies the relationship between stock options 
and performance and whether or not the relationship is positive. In addition to 
multiple regressions on the total sample, a simple regression of last year’s granted 
options relative to following year’s company performance is performed. Some of 
the results show that there is a significant negative relationship between 
compensation and performance. This is inconsistent with our hypotheses and 
agency theory, which states that there is a positive relationship between company 
performance and remuneration because the interest of the shareholders and 
employees should be aligned when using incentive-based pay. Other results show 
a negative but insignificant relationship between compensation and performance, 
indicating that there is a probability that a positive relation exists. A positive 
relationship between compensation and performance is consistent with studies by 
Murphy (2012). 
 
Additionally, we found that last year’s granted options have a positive effect on 
the following year’s performance and that last year’s performance has a positive 
effect on following year’s granted options, which is consistent with agency theory 
and findings of Murphy (2012) on US companies. Again the results are 
insignificant, meaning that we have to keep the null hypotheses that last year’s 
performance do not affect this year’s granted options and vice versa. 
 
The conclusion of our findings suggests that IFRS-2 led to a decrease in the 
number of stock options in most of the Norwegian companies analyzed and that 
the relationship between stock options and performance is negative. The latter 
results are in many cases insignificant and the relationship might therefore be 
positive.  Even though many companies decreased the number of options due to 
the new regulation, many did not stop using incentive-based payment; they just 
shifted to LTI-programs and other types of remuneration. The insignificant results 
of the analysis of performance and stock options may be due to the small sample 
size and also it could be that different results would be found on other 
performance measures.  
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One relevant limitation is the small sample size, which is caused by studying a 
small market with limited availability on compensation data. In addition more 
than one performance measure could have been used to test the relationship 
between performance and compensation. Oslo Stock Exchange is a very small 
exchange compared to exchanges in other countries such as the US, France, the 
UK and Germany. Testing our hypotheses in one of these countries might give 
more robust results due to larger sample size. 
 
Suggestions for further research are to include not only companies that exist on 
the stock exchange today, but throughout the entire timeframe. Other legislations, 
especially tax legislations could be tested relative to the use of share based 
payment and the effect of the financial crisis in 2007 could be implemented in the 
analyses. 
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10. Appendix 
Appendix 1: Accounting Legislations and Tax Laws 
 
The Norwegian Accounting legislation (in Norwegian) 
 
§ 4-1. Grunnleggende regnskapsprinsipper 
       Årsregnskapet skal utarbeides i samsvar med følgende grunnleggende 
regnskapsprinsipper: 
1. Transaksjoner skal regnskapsføres til verdien av vederlaget på 
transaksjonstidspunktet (transaksjonsprinsippet). 
2. Inntekt skal resultatføres når den er opptjent (opptjeningsprinsippet). 
3. Utgifter skal kostnadsføres i samme periode som tilhørende inntekt 
(sammenstillingsprinsippet). 
4. Urealisert tap skal resultatføres (forsiktighetsprinsippet). 
5. Ved sikring skal gevinst og tap resultatføres i samme periode. 
       Små foretak kan fravike de grunnleggende prinsippene om opptjening og 
sammenstilling, jf. første ledd nr. 2 og 3, når dette kan anses som god 
regnskapsskikk for små foretak. Små foretak kan fravike det grunnleggende 
prinsippet om sikring, jf. første ledd nr. 5. 
       Regnskapspliktig som nevnt i § 1-2 nr. 9, 10 eller 11 og som ikke har 
økonomisk vinning som formål, kan fravike de grunnleggende prinsippene om 
transaksjon, opptjening og sammenstilling, jf. første ledd nr. 1, 2 og 3, når dette 
kan anses som god regnskapsskikk for slike regnskapspliktige. 
 
§ 5-9a. Aksjeverdibasert betaling 
       Aksjeverdibasert betaling skal regnskapsføres til virkelig verdi på 
transaksjonstidspunktet. 
       Små foretak kan unnlate å kostnadsføre aksjeverdibasert avlønning. 
 
Source: http://lovdata.no/all/tl-19980717-056-004.html#4-1, http://lovdata.no/all/tl-
19980717-056-007.html#5-9a 
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The Norwegian Tax Law (in Norwegian)  
 
§ 5-14 (3). Særlig om aksjer og opsjoner m.v. i arbeidsforhold 
(3) For fordel ved opsjon m.v. i arbeidsforhold gjelder: 
a. Fordel ved innløsning eller salg av rett til erverv av eller salg av aksje eller 
grunnfondsbevis i arbeidsforhold, regnes som fordel vunnet ved arbeid etter § 
5-10. Som slik rett anses både rett til erverv av eksisterende aksje eller 
grunnfondsbevis og rett til å tegne aksje eller grunnfondsbevis ved en senere 
emisjon. Dette gjelder også dersom retten er knyttet til fordring eller 
verdipapir. Fordelen fastsettes slik: 
1. Ved innløsning av rett til erverv av aksje eller grunnfondsbevis settes 
fordelen til differansen mellom aksjens eller grunnfondsbevisets 
omsetningsverdi og innløsningsprisen, fratrukket skattyters kostpris for 
retten. Ved innløsning av rett til salg av aksje eller grunnfondsbevis settes 
fordelen til differansen mellom innløsningsprisen og aksjens eller 
grunnfondsbevisets omsetningsverdi, fratrukket kostprisen. 
2. Ved salg av retten settes fordelen til differansen mellom salgssum og 
kostpris. Overføring av slik rett til nærstående regnes ikke som salg etter 
denne bokstav. Som nærstående regnes i alle tilfelle personer som 
skattyteren er i slekt eller svogerskap med i opp- eller nedstigende linje, 
samt første og andre sidelinje. Innløsning fra den nærstående til annen ikke 
nærstående regnes som innløsning eller salg fra skattyteren. 
b. Departementet gir forskrift om tidfesting av og beregning av det enkelte års 
skattepliktige inntekt etter bokstav a. 
c. Departementet kan gi forskrift til utfylling og gjennomføring av skattlegging 
etter dette ledd. 
 
§ 19-2 (5). Overgangsbestemmelser 
(5) Til bestemmelsen i § 5-14 tredje ledd bokstav a, gjelder følgende 
overgangsregler for rett til erverv eller salg av opsjoner ervervet i inntektsårene 
1996-2001: 
a. Ved innløsning av retten settes fordelen til den del av differansen mellom 
aksjens eller grunnfondsbevisets omsetningsverdi og innløsningsprisen som 
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overstiger skattyterens kostpris for retten og skattlagt fordel ved ervervet av 
retten. 
b. Ved salg av retten settes fordelen til den del av differansen mellom salgssum 
og kostpris som overstiger skattlagt fordel ved ervervet av retten. 
c. Beløp som er skattlagt ved ervervet, kan fradras i inntekt ved senere bortfall av 
retten. Ved utnyttelse av retten i form av innløsning til lavere verdi enn 
ervervsbeløpet gis slikt fradrag for differansen mellom ervervsbeløpet og 
innløsningsverdien. Med innløsningsverdi menes her omsetningsverdien av 
den underliggende aksjen eller grunnfondsbeviset på innløsningstidspunktet, 
fratrukket innløsningsprisen. Ved utnyttelse av retten i form av salg til lavere 
pris enn ervervsbeløpet, gis slikt fradrag for differansen mellom 
ervervsbeløpet og salgssummen. 
 
Source: http://www.lovdata.no/cgi-wift/wiftldles?doc=/app/gratis/www/docroot/all/nl-
19990326-014.html&emne=SKATTELOV*&& 
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Appendix 2: Partly Government owned companies, 2006 and 2012 
Year 2006: Comany name: Government ownership
Cermaq ASA 43,54 %
DNB Nor ASA 34,00 %
Kongsberg Group ASA 50,00 %
Norsk Hydro ASA 43,82 %
Raufoss ASA 50,27 %
SAS AB 14,28 %
Statoil ASA 70,90 %
Telenor ASA 54,00 %
Yara International ASA 36,21 %
Year 2012: Cermaq ASA 44,00 %
DNB ASA 34,00 %
Kongsberg Group ASA 50,00 %
Norsk Hydro ASA 34,00 %
SAS AB 14,00 %
Statoil ASA 67,00 %
Telenor ASA 54,00 %
Yara International ASA 36,00 %
Source: St. Meld.nr.13 2006-2007 and Statens Eierberetning 2012
Government ownership in companies listed on Oslo stock exchange
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Appendix 3: 50 biggest companies in Oslo Stock Exchange, sorted by MV 
 
Source: 
http://www.oslobors.no/ob_eng/markedsaktivitet/sectors?newt__menuCtx=1.1.3 
http://www.oslobors.no/ob_eng/Oslo-Boers/Statistics/Annual-statistics 
Year (end of year) Company Market value in NOK 1000 Of the total % Sector
2012 Statoil 443 221 800                          32,65 % Energy
2012 Telenor 175 026 000                          12,89 % Telecommunication services
2012 DNB 114 667 400                          8,45 % Financials
2012 Yara International 77 815 810                            5,73 % Materials
2012 Norsk Hydro 57 683 640                            4,25 % Materials
2012 Orkla 49 418 110                            3,64 % Consumer Staples
2012 Gjensidige Forsikring 39 700 000                            2,92 % Financials
2012 Aker Solutions 30 934 590                            2,28 % Energy
2012 Schibsted 25 434 840                            1,87 % Consumer discretionary
2012 Petroleum Geo-Services 20 767 210                            1,53 % Energy
2012 Marine Harvest 19 191 490                            1,41 % Consumer Staples
2012 TGS 18 772 800                            1,38 % Energy
2012 Fred. Olsen Energy 16 126 650                            1,19 % Energy
2012 Aker 15 343 430                            1,13 % Financials
2012 Kongsberg Gruppen 14 940 000                            1,10 % Industry
2012 Storebrand 12 066 580                            0,89 % Financials
2012 Det norske oljeselskap 11 608 350                            0,86 % Energy
2012 Wilh. Wilhelmsen 10 934 000                            0,81 % Industry
2012 DNO International 9 531 840                              0,70 % Energy
2012 SpareBank 1 SR-Bank 9 513 930                              0,70 % Financials
2012 Olav Thon Eiendomsselskap 9 473 630                              0,70 % Financials
2012 Cermaq 7 746 880                              0,57 % Consumer Staples
2012 Tomra Systems 7 438 000                              0,55 % Industry
2012 Stolt-Nielsen 7 375 380                              0,54 % Industry
2012 Lerøy Seafood Group 7 067 770                              0,52 % Consumer Staples
2012 Algeta 6 583 210                              0,48 % Health care
2012 Atea 6 075 060                              0,45 % Information Technology
2012 Hafslund 5 973 390                              0,44 % Utilities
2012 Veidekke 5 883 020                              0,43 % Industry
2012 Austvoll Seafoods 5 777 440                              0,43 % Consumer Staples
2012 Salmar 5 064 500                              0,37 % Consumer Staples
2012 Norwegian Air Shuttle 5 059 830                              0,37 % Industry
2012 Norwegian Property 4 661 790                              0,34 % Financials
2012 Opera Software 3 778 560                              0,28 % Information Technology
2012 Ekornes 3 406 470                              0,25 % Consumer discretionary
2012 Bakkafrost 2 955 910                              0,22 % Consumer Staples
2012 EMGS 2 597 370                              0,19 % Energy
2012 Nordic Semiconductor 2 369 890                              0,17 % Information Technology
2012 EVRY 2 352 580                              0,17 % Information Technology
2012 ABG Sundall Collier 1 844 150                              0,14 % Financials
2012 Golden Ocean 1 786 790                              0,13 % Industry
2012 BWG Homes 1 640 260                              0,12 % Consumer discretionary
2012 Odefjell 1 576 560                              0,12 % Industry
2012 Songa Offshore 1 502 570                              0,11 % Energy
2012 Frontline 1 440 380                              0,11 % Energy
2012 Eltek 1 303 650                              0,10 % Information Technology
2012 Q-free 1 298 270                              0,10 % Information Technology
2012 Kongsberg Automotive 602 020                                0,04 % Consumer discretionary
2012 Bionor Pharma 512 200                                0,04 % Health care
2012 Clavis Pharma 263 290                                0,02 % Health care
1"288"109"290""""""""""""""""""""""" 94,89"%Sum"market"value"and"in"percent"in"Oslo"stock"exchange
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Appendix 4: Overview of companies using LTI-programs 
Summary of partly government owned companies and LTI-program transition: 
- Cermaq ended their options program in 2008, and no options were granted after 
June 2008 (annual report 2012, page 75). 
- Kongsberg Gruppen ended its options program in 2006, but continued with its 
share-based program that is still in progress as of 2012, (annual report 2008, page 
34) and (annual report 2012, page 88). 
- Norsk Hydro ended its option program in 2007, but stated a LTI-program in 
2010 for its CEO and executive management, (annual report 2007, page 33 and 
annual report 2010, page 53) 
- Statoil introduced in 2004 when they implemented FAS 123 (R) (IFRS-2 from 
January 1. 2007) a share-based program, and they still use the share-based 
payment program as of 2012, (annual report 2005, page 101) (annual report 2012, 
page 42). 
- Telenor ended its options based incentive program in 2007, and stated a long-
term incentive program instead for its key personnel (annual report 2007, page 72) 
and it still exists in 2012 (annual report 2012, page 87) 
- Yara International established in 2004 a share-based incentive program, the 
same year they were listed on Oslo Stock exchange (annual report 2004, page 58). 
And in 2008 the board of directors approved a long-term incentive program for 
management and top executive, which applies today as well (annual report 2012, 
page 91).  
 
Summary of other companies using LTI-programs: 
- Schibsted changed their use of stock options until a ”LTI”-program in 2010, 
using the same accounting rules as IFRS-2 (annual report 2010, page 189). 
- Gjensidige was listed on Oslo Stock Exchange in 2010 and offer share incentive 
program for every employee from 2011 (annual report 2011, page 130) 
- Storebrand started to use LTI-programs for executives in 2008, but did not use 
stock options program previous to that year (annual report 2008, page 89). 
- TGS changed the form of using options until using a form of LTI-program as 
they call, Stock Appreciation Rights (SARs) in 2010 (annual report 2012, page 
41).  
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- Tomra Systems established in 2010 a Long-Term Incentive Plan, but already in 
2006 it was established a Long-Term cash-based incentive plan for management 
(annual report 2012, page 62). 
- Wilhelm Wilhelmsen started in January 2011 a share-price-based incentive 
program for management (annual report 2012, page 38), while earlier they used 
options as incentive payment.  
- EVRY established in 2011 a long-term share based system, after using an 
options program until that year (annual report 2012, page 93) 
- Opera Software approved in 2011 a new long-term equity based incentive 
program, which they called a “new stock repurchase program” (annual report 
2012, page 116) 
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Appendix 5: Correlation of residuals 
Companies: Atea Eltek EVRY Nordic Semiconductor
Atea 1
Eltek 0,16 1
EVRY 0,09 0,53 1
Nordic Semiconductor -0,25 0,19 0,38 1
Correlation resduals: IT-industry
 
Table 10 - Correlation of residuals in the IT-industry 
Companies: DNO Fred Olsen Energy PGS TGS
DNO 1
Fred Olsen Energy -0,26 1
PGS 0,66 -1,00 1
TGS 0,67 -0,73 0,48 1
Correlation resduals: Energy industry
 
Table 11 - Correlation of residuals in the Energy industry 
Companies: DNO Fred Olsen Energy PGS TGS ABG$Sundall$Collier
DNO 1
Fred Olsen Energy -0,26 1
PGS 0,66 -1,00 1
TGS 0,67 -0,73 0,48 1
ABG$Sundall$Collier 0,76 0,82 0,67 0,69 1
Correlation resduals: Financial industry
 
Table 12 - Correlation of residuals in the Financial industry 
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Appendix 6: Autocorrelation, Durbin Watson 
Regression: DW stat: dL: dU: Number of variables: Conclusion:
1a, part 1 0,45177 1,441 1,647 5 Positive autocorrelation
1b, part 1 0,26794 1,557 1,693 5 Positive autocorrelation
1a, part 2 0,36633 1,530 1,722 7 Positive autocorrelation
1b, part 2 0,87938 1,603 1, 746 7 Positive autocorrelation
2a, part 2 2,24593 1,362 1,657 6 No autocorrelation
2b, part 2 1,99479 1,283 1,645 6 No autocorrelation
3a, part 2 1,75627 1,496 1,541 1 No autocorrelation
3b, part 2 0,58187 1,496 1,541 1 Positive autocorrelation
Testing for autocorrelation with Durbin Watson test
 
Table 13 – Durbin Watson test 
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Appendix 7: Normality of residuals 
Part 1: Graph and regression analyses  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part 2: Regression analyses 
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Appendix 8: Graphs from dataset 
 
This graph below illustrates granted options to CEOs as in the main text, but also 
includes a separated graph with granted options to employees that we find 
interesting thus wanted to include here.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Master thesis Share-based payment and IFRS-2 02.09.2013 
Page 58 
Appendix 9: Skewness and Kurtosis 
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Appendix 10: Regressions and results from part 1 of the results section 
Graph 1: CEO GRANTED OPTIONS & TOTAL GRANTED OPTIONS 
 !"#!!"#$%&'! "#$!%&! = !!! + !!!IFRS2! !+ !!!PTBV! !+ !!!SIZE! !+ !!!DEBT!RATIO! !+!!!RISK!ADJ!RETURN!! + !ε!, !ℎ!"!!!!!"#$%&!!"#$!!"#!!!!"!!ℎ!!!"#$%&$'#   
R Square Adjusted R Square S.E. of regression F-statistic Prob(F-statistic)
0.039677 -0.033075 1.728687 0.545376 0.741212
Model Coefficient Std. Error t-statistics Sig.
(Constant) 11.77069 2.075386 5.671565 0.0000
IFRS 2 0.854323 0.812443 1.051548 0.2968
PTBV 0.033204 0.082531 0.402314 0.6888
SIZE -0.042282 0.129274 -0.327073 0.7446
DEBT RATIO 0.006406 0.012086 0.529986 0.5979
RISK ADJ RETURN 0.018263 0.161775 0.112892 0.9105
***,**, and * denote a significane level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Coefficients
Model Summary
 
 !"!#$!!"#$%&'! "#$!%&! = !!! + !!!IFRS2! !+ !!!PTBV! !+ !!!SIZE! !+ !!!DEBT!RATIO! !+!!!RISK!ADJ!RETURN!! + !ε!, !ℎ!"!!!!!"#$%&!!"#$!!"#!!!!"!!ℎ!!!"#$%&$'#   
R Square Adjusted R Square S.E. of regression F-statistic Prob(F-statistic)
0.058628 0.004526 1.381384 1.083657 0.375148
Model Coefficient Std. Error t-statistics Sig.
(Constant) 14.48135 1.960900 7.385052 0.0000
IFRS 2 -0.078809 0.515978 -0.152737 0.8790
PTBV 0.052835 0.044624 1.184024 0.2396
SIZE -0.072898 0.128759 -0.566157 0.5727
DEBT RATIO -0.011162 0.012138 -0.919600 0.3603
RISK ADJ RETURN -0.016704 0.092315 -0.180952 0.8568
***,**, and * denote a significane level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Coefficients
Model Summary
 
 
Graph 2: IT - INDUSTRY !"#! "#$!%&! = !!! + !!!IFRS2! !+ !!!PTBV! !+ !!!SIZE! !+ !!!DEBT!RATIO! !+ !!!RISK!ADJ!RETURN!! + !ε!,!ℎ!"!!!!!"#$%&!!"#$!!"#!!!!"!!ℎ!!!"#$%&$'#  
R Square Adjusted R Square S.E. of regression F-statistic Prob(F-statistic)
0.313375 0.181332 0.906868 2.373274 0.066926*
Model Coefficient Std. Error t-statistics Sig.
(Constant) 8.102314 1.550461 5.225746 0.0000
IFRS 2 0.124536 0.308020 0.404313 0.6893
PTBV 0.121445 0.033844 3.588319 0.0014***
SIZE 0.289540 0.105493 2.744638 0.0108**
DEBT RATIO -0.028419 0.013402 -2.120404 0.0437**
RISK ADJ RETURN -0.105300 0.100786 -1.044785 0.3057
***,**, and * denote a significane level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Coefficients
Model Summary
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!"!#$! "#$!%&! = !!! + !!!IFRS2! !+ !!!PTBV! !+ !!!SIZE! !+ !!!DEBT!RATIO! !+ !!!RISK!ADJ!RETURN!! + !ε!,!ℎ!"!!!!!"#$%&!!"#$!!"#!!!!"!!ℎ!!!"#$%&$'#  
R Square Adjusted R Square S.E. of regression F-statistic Prob(F-statistic)
0.208937 0.085333 0.963661 1.690378 0.165354
Model Coefficient Std. Error t-statistics Sig.
(Constant) 8.057895 2.038953 3.951977 0.0004
IFRS 2 -0.317138 0.211011 -1.502946 0.1427
PTBV 0.084470 0.028458 2.968264 0.0056***
SIZE 0.440405 0.137815 3.195615 0.0031***
DEBT RATIO -0.021583 0.012230 -1.764788 0.0871*
RISK ADJ RETURN -0.042442 0.087355 -0.485853 0.6304
***,**, and * denote a significane level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Coefficients
Model Summary
 
 !"#$!%&! "#"$%!%#&! = !!! + !!!IFRS2! !+ !!!PTBV! !+ !!!SIZE! !+ !!!DEBT!RATIO! !+!!!RISK!ADJ!RETURN!! + !ε!, !ℎ!"!!!!!"#$%&!!"#$!!"#!!!!"!!ℎ!!!"#$%&$'#   
R Square Adjusted R Square S.E. of regression F-statistic Prob(F-statistic)
0.164425 0.025162 1.312423 1.180682 0.341833
Model Coefficient Std. Error t-statistics Sig.
(Constant) 9.050686 3.419721 2.646616 0.0128
IFRS 2 0.188963 0.776640 0.243308 0.8094
PTBV 0.073291 0.084478 0.867572 0.3925
SIZE 0.295505 0.226218 1.306286 0.2014
DEBT RATIO -0.030154 0.020738 -1.454057 0.1563
RISK ADJ RETURN 0.119936 0.185319 0.647186 0.5224
***,**, and * denote a significane level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Coefficients
Model Summary
 
 
Graph 3: FINANCIAL INDUSTRY !"#$!%&! "#"$%!%#&! = !!! + !!!IFRS2! !+ !!!PTBV! !+ !!!SIZE! !+ !!!DEBT!RATIO! !+!!!RISK!ADJ!RETURN!! + !ε!, !ℎ!"!!!!!"#$%&!!"#$!!"#!!!!"!!ℎ!!!"#$%&$'#  
R Square Adjusted R Square S.E. of regression F-statistic Prob(F-statistic)
0.066509 -0.019925 4498.011 0.769476 0.575897
Model Coefficient Std. Error t-statistics Sig.
(Constant) -9401.859 8139.463 -1.155096 0.2531
IFRS 2 -1193.577 1152.854 -1.035323 0.3051
PTBV 403.1538 405.2419 0.994847 0.3242
SIZE 533.8761 454.8291 1.173795 0.2456
DEBT RATIO 13.84364 19.28155 0.717973 0.4759
RISK ADJ RETURN -239.0022 435.8406 -0.548371 0.5857
***,**, and * denote a significane level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Coefficients
Model Summary
 !"#$!%&!!"#$%&!!'! = !!! + !!!IFRS2! !+ !!!PTBV! !+ !!!SIZE! !+ !!!DEBT!RATIO! !+!!RISK!ADJ!RETURN!! + !ε! , !ℎ!"!!!!!"#$%&!!"#$!!"#!!!!"!!ℎ!!!"#$%&$'#   
R Square Adjusted R Square S.E. of regression F-statistic Prob(F-statistic)
0.069501 -0.016656 6588452. 0.806678 0.549973
Model Coefficient Std. Error t-statistics Sig.
(Constant) -14212152 12197502 -1.165169 0.2491
IFRS 2 -1861087. 1811657. -1.027284 0.3089
PTBV 586341.9 590118.8 0.993600 0.3248
SIZE 806789.4 681449.8 1.183931 0.2416
DEBT RATIO 20569.59 28627.14 0.718535 0.4755
RISK ADJ RETURN -193732.0 589014.1 -0.328909 0.7435
***,**, and * denote a significane level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Coefficients
Model Summary
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Graph 4: ENERGY INDUSTRY !"#! "#$!%&! = !!! + !!!IFRS2! !+ !!!PTBV! !+ !!!SIZE! !+ !!!DEBT!RATIO! !+ !!!RISK!ADJ!RETURN!! + !ε!,!ℎ!"!!!!!"#$%&!!"#$!!"#!!!!"!!ℎ!!!"#$%&$'#   
R Square Adjusted R Square S.E. of regression F-statistic Prob(F-statistic)
0.225060 0.063614 0.827955 1.394024 0.261857
Model Coefficient Std. Error t-statistics Sig.
(Constant) 15.07857 3.825681 3.941409 0.0006
IFRS 2 -0.697304 0.396984 -1.756503 0.0918*
PTBV 0.068564 0.065609 1.045042 0.3064
SIZE -0.199089 0.246293 -0.808344 0.4268
DEBT RATIO 0.008990 0.010246 0.877427 0.3890
RISK ADJ RETURN -0.163241 0.104770 -1.558094 0.1323
***,**, and * denote a significane level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Coefficients
Model Summary
 
 !"!#$! "#$!%&! = !!! + !!!IFRS2! !+ !!!PTBV! !+ !!!SIZE! !+ !!!DEBT!RATIO! !+ !!!RISK!ADJ!RETURN!! + !ε!,!ℎ!"!!!!!"#$%&!!"#$!!"#!!!!"!!ℎ!!!"#$%&$'#   
R Square Adjusted R Square S.E. of regression F-statistic Prob(F-statistic)
0.089829 -0.078722 1.728427 0.532948 0.749407
Model Coefficient Std. Error t-statistics Sig.
(Constant) 8.926033 4.463044 1.999988 0.0557
IFRS 2 -0.037930 0.792488 -0.047862 0.9622
PTBV 0.067524 0.084724 0.796987 0.4324
SIZE 0.369880 0.292544 1.264359 0.2169
DEBT RATIO -0.020170 0.013388 -1.506570 0.1435
RISK ADJ RETURN -0.270281 0.169898 -1.590842 0.1233
***,**, and * denote a significane level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Coefficients
Model Summary
 
 !"#$!%&! "#"$%!%#&! = !!! + !!!IFRS2! !+ !!!PTBV! !+ !!!SIZE! !+ !!!DEBT!RATIO! !+!!!RISK!ADJ!RETURN!! + !ε!, !ℎ!"!!!!!"#$%&!!"#$!!"#!!!!"!!ℎ!!!"#$%&$'#   
R Square Adjusted R Square S.E. of regression F-statistic Prob(F-statistic)
0.133702 -0.039558 1.079011 0.771686 0.579125
Model Coefficient Std. Error t-statistics Sig.
(Constant) 12.48479 4.962115 2.516023 0.0187
IFRS 2 -0.381774 0.919738 -0.415090 0.6816
PTBV 0.116489 0.083437 1.396137 0.1749
SIZE 0.052002 0.315186 0.164989 0.8703
DEBT RATIO -0.006114 0.008178 -0.747526 0.4617
RISK ADJ RETURN -0.209261 0.129434 -1.616739 0.1185
***,**, and * denote a significane level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Coefficients
Model Summary
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Master thesis Share-based payment and IFRS-2 02.09.2013 
Page 62 
Appendix 11: Regressions and results from part 2 of the results section 
Model 1: GRANTED OPTIONS (2001-2012) !"#$%&'! "#$!%&!!"!#$!! = !!! + !!!ROE! !+ !!!SIZE! !+ !!!PTBV! !+ !!!DEBT!RATIO! !+!!!ROA!! + !!RISK!ADJ!RETURN!! + !!DIVIDEND!PER!SHARE!! + !ε! ,!ℎ!"!!!!!"#$%&!!"#$!!"#!!!!"!!ℎ!!!"#$%&$'#  
 
R Square Adjusted R Square S.E. of regression F-statistic Prob(F-statistic)
0.165020 0.096256 1.316201 2.399827 0.027306**
Model Coefficient Std. Error t-statistics Sig.
(Constant) 14.01030 2.331456 6.009249 0.0000
ROE -0.044252 0.237385 -0.186415 0.8526
SIZE -0.016965 0.153099 -0.110813 0.9120
PTBV 0.040130 0.042125 0.952628 0.3435
DEBT RATIO -0.011820 0.011940 -0.989890 0.3250
ROA -0.786654 1.177588 -0.668021 0.5059
RISK ADJ RETURN 0.029636 0.108807 0.272371 0.7860
DIVIDEND PER SHARE -0.207301 0.068893 -3.009047 0.0034***
***,**, and * denote a significane level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Coefficients
Model Summary
 
 
Model 2: CEO OPTIONS (2001-2012) !"#! "#$!%&!! = !!! + !!!ROE! !+ !!!SIZE! !+ !!!PTBV! !+ !!!DEBT!RATIO! !+ !!!ROA!! +!!RISK!ADJ!RETURN!! + !!DIVIDEND!PER!SHARE!! + !ε! ,!ℎ!"!!!!!"#$%&!!"#$!!"#!!!!"!!ℎ!!!"#$%&$'#  
R Square Adjusted R Square S.E. of regression F-statistic Prob(F-statistic)
0.111130 0.060952 1.562249 2.214710 0.037334**
Model Coefficient Std. Error t-statistics Sig.
(Constant) 12.41870 1.567769 7.921252 0.0000
ROE -0.291881 0.439589 -0.663986 0.5079
SIZE -0.012097 0.092269 -0.131107 0.8959
PTBV 0.087870 0.055833 1.573814 0.1181
DEBT RATIO -0.007204 0.009638 -0.747492 0.4562
ROA 0.502415 1.479399 0.339607 0.7347
RISK ADJ RETURN -0.261684 0.124388 -2.103776 0.0374**
DIVIDEND PER SHARE -0.148709 0.069959 -2.125663 0.0355**
***,**, and * denote a significane level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Coefficients
Model Summary
 
 
Model 3: RISK ADJ RETURN (2001-2012) !"#$!!"#!!"#$!%!! = !!! + !!!PTBV! !+ !!!SIZE! !+ !!!DEBT!RATIO! !+ !!!CEO!SALARY! !+!!!CEO!GRANTED!OPTIONS! + !!CEO!OPTIONS!! + !!!DIVIDEND!PER!SHARE! !+!ε! ,!ℎ!"!!!!!"#$%&!!"#$!!"#!!!!"!!ℎ!!!"#$%&$'#   
R Square Adjusted R Square S.E. of regression F-statistic Prob(F-statistic)
0.362818 0.290878 1.104912 5.043355 0.000144***
Model Coefficient Std. Error t-statistics Sig.
(Constant) -4.300411 3.576186 -1.202513 0.2337
PTBV 0.215235 0.058576 3.674469 0.0005***
SIZE 0.192578 0.089526 2.151070 0.0354**
DEBT RATIO -0.021506 0.008100 -2.655214 0.0101**
LOG CEO SALARY 0.094804 0.270997 0.349835 0.7276
LOG CEO GRANTED OPTIONS 0.239128 0.141050 1.695347 0.0950*
LOG CEO OPTIONS -0.245137 0.152722 -1.605118 0.1135
DIVIDEND PER SHARE 0.095388 0.046837 2.036612 0.0460**
***,**, and * denote a significane level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Coefficients
Model Summary
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Model 4: RISK ADJ RETURN (2001-2012) !"#$!!"#!!"#$!%!! = !!! + !!!PTBV! !+ !!!SIZE! !+ !!!DEBT!RATIO! !+ !!!TOTAL!SALARY! !+!!!GRANTED!OPTIONS! + !!TOTAL!OPTIONS!! + !!!DIVIDEND!PER!SHARE! !+!ε! ,!ℎ!"!!!!!"#$%&!!"#$!!"#!!!!"!!ℎ!!!"#$%&$'#  
 
R Square Adjusted R Square S.E. of regression F-statistic Prob(F-statistic)
0.278511 0.216160 1.118367 4.466824 0.000303***
Model Coefficient Std. Error t-statistics Sig.
(Constant) -1.976902 1.865017 -1.059991 0.2923
PTBV 0.213790 0.043252 4.942903 0.0000***
SIZE 0.268291 0.100911 2.658689 0.0095***
DEBT RATIO -0.014338 0.007615 -1.882782 0.0633*
LOG TOTAL SALARY -0.128808 0.096820 -1.330386 0.1871
LOG GRANTED OPTIONS -0.070476 0.115177 -0.611892 0.5423
LOG TOTAL OPTIONS 0.076732 0.112417 0.682562 0.4968
DIVIDEND PER SHARE 0.054033 0.043228 1.249955 0.2149
***,**, and * denote a significane level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Coefficients
Model Summary
 
 
Model 5: CEO GRANTED OPTIONS (2001-2012) !"#!GRANTED!OPTIONS! = !!! + !!!!!"#$!!"#!!"#$!%!!! !+ !ε! ,!ℎ!"!!!!!"#$%&!!"#$!!"#!!!!"!!ℎ!!!"#$%&$'#  
 
R Square Adjusted R Square S.E. of regression F-statistic Prob(F-statistic)
0.004839 -0.009377 1.708745 0.340389 0.561480
Model Coefficient Std. Error t-statistics Sig.
(Constant) 11.41693 0.289987 39.37048 0.0000
RISK ADJ RETURN (t-1) 0.095276 0.155729 0.611804 0.5426
***,**, and * denote a significane level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Coefficients
Model Summary
 
 
Model 6: RISK ADJ RETURN !"#$!!"#!!"#$!%!! = !!! + !!!TOTAL!OPTIONS!!! !+ !ε! ,!ℎ!"!!!!!"#$%&!!"#$!!"#!!!!"!!ℎ!!!"#$%&$'#  
 
R Square Adjusted R Square S.E. of regression F-statistic Prob(F-statistic)
0.007426 0.000809 1.157987 1.122211 0.291146
Model Coefficient Std. Error t-statistics Sig.
(Constant) 1.029107 0.659561 1.560291 0.1208
LOG TOTAL OPTIONS (t-1) -0.061295 0.045447 -1.348717 0.1795
***,**, and * denote a significane level of 1%, 5% and 10%.
Coefficients
Model Summary
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Introduction 
 
In this thesis we will look at what motivates the use of stock options as 
compensation to executives in Norwegian firms. Executive compensation is a 
subject that has received a great amount of attention for many years, especially in 
the US where executive pay has been higher than anywhere else (Nielsen and 
Randoy, 2002). People have different opinions on whether executive 
compensation is creating value for a firm, or if it is just a way of paying the 
executives even more. Some argue that most executives get paid enough with their 
base salary, and that this remuneration should be enough without them demanding 
more incentive compensation to take the actions shareholders request.  
 
Earlier studies have focused primarily on the US and many of them lack to 
identify that political and other socioeconomic factors are of relevance for 
executive stock option compensation (Hall and Murphy, 2002). In our study we 
will look at executive stock options based on data of Norwegian companies listed 
on the Oslo Stock Exchange. Our analysis will be performed similarly like earlier 
studies completed by Kevin Murphy as he did on US data. In addition we will 
show that non-option based factors also affects the use of stock options as a 
compensation-tool (Oxelheim and Randoy, 2008).  
 
In order to identify the motivational factors of using executive stock options, we 
will use both a quantitative and a qualitative approach. We will use the certainty 
equivalent framework from Hall and Murphy (2002) to address whether or not 
there exists a gap between the values the shareholder and the values the executive 
place on an option in Norwegian firms, and the implications this gap has for the 
use of options. We will also look at how the number of options issued by 
companies changed in the period from year 2000 to 2010 relative to regulations by 
government on executive stock option compensation. In addition we will perform 
interviews in order to identify which non-quantifiable factors like economic 
transparency affect the use of stock options. 
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Literature review 
Our thesis will be based on previous work within the field of executive 
compensation. In this review we will go through history, theories and accounting 
legislations that have led to the share-based compensation for executives we have 
today, and we will start from the1990s in the US. Thereafter we will reflect upon 
the Scandinavian countries, and identify which factors Norway builds their 
executive compensation plan upon.  
Stock Option Theory 
An executive stock option is an option given to executives as an incentive for 
increasing company’s market value, and unlike for regular options there exists no 
external capital market (Lai 2010). Through executive stock options the 
underwriter (shareholder) issues options to the recipient (executives), and if the 
stock price goes up both parties will benefit as the shareholder wants to maximize 
the stock price and the executive will receive greater pay (Lai 2010). Firms that 
use options as executive compensation typically issue them each year, with the 
strike price set equal to the prevailing stock price. While maturities vary across 
firms, these options are typically long term. Firms usually restrict when and 
whether these options can be exercised (Damodaran 2005). There are several 
types of stock options, where the incentive stock option is the one relevant to us. 
An incentive stock option is subject to additional rules designed to minimize 
taxes, e.g. they are not taxed to the shareholder when granted or exercised (under 
the regular tax); tax is imposed only when the stock is sold (Bickley 2012).  
 
There are four purposes for stock options referred to as attract, retain, motivate 
and recognize (Glimstedt et al. 2006). The purposes are to attract the best 
executives, keep the best executives in the company, motivate them to work 
harder, and to recognize their contribution to the company. Hall and Murphy 
(2002) discuss similar issues where highly skilled executives receive non-tradable 
options to stay in the firm until the options expire.  
Why stock options as executive compensation instrument? 
There are several arguments that support the use of stock options as executive 
compensation. We will mention four in particular that plays a significant role 
when firm choose stock options as instrument for compensation. The arguments 
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are stated in the article of Drobetz et al (2007). The first argument is that stock 
options attract executives that are relatively less risk-averse and highly skilled, 
because they will see an upside in the firm. The second argument is that 
executives will retain in the firm, as mentioned above, when they receive non-
tradable stock options. Thirdly, giving stock options to executives will make them 
think like owners when they become owners. The last argument takes an 
accounting perspective, stating from the firm perspective, that stock options will 
be regarded as a relatively cheap way of compensating executives.  
Methods of Pricing Stock Options 
To estimate the fair value of a stock option there are several conditions to account 
for such as market conditions, expected stock price volatility, risk free rate, 
expected dividend, exercise price, underlying stock price, non-vesting conditions 
and option lifetime2.  
The most common used model for valuing stock options is the Black-Scholes 
model (developed by Black, Scholes, 1973), and there is also the Binomial pricing 
model (developed by Cox, Ross and Rubenstein, 1979). Both models build around 
the same theoretical assumptions and foundations, such as price behavior and the 
risk-neutral valuation.   
The Black-Scholes model acts under the assumption of continuous time under the 
normal distribution. The accurate and dynamic view of the option price in this 
model is due to the constant change in the option price, stock price and the delta. 
The binomial model differs from the Black-Scholes model in the two-step way of 
the underlying stock of either going up or down. The option price, stock price and 
the delta will only change when the binomial model turns into the next period.  
 
In our paper we will use the Black-Scholes model to estimate the option value, 
and use it to estimate the value gap of options with respect to shareholders and 
executives. 
Principal-Agent Theory 
In 1976 principal-agent theory was introduced, and it is the main theory that forms 
the basis for implementation of incentive systems. It concerns how the principals 
delegate their interests to the agents, which is equivalent to the relationship 
                                                
2 Figure 4.13, Fokus på IFRS, aksjebasert betaling, KPMG. 
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between shareholders and executives. In agency relationships, the principal’s 
objective is typically to maximize the difference between the value it receives as a 
result of the agent’s actions and any compensation it makes to the agent. The 
theory predicts a negative relation between risk and incentives, or alternatively, a 
positive relation between risk aversion and incentives (Murphy, 2012)  
Problems arise when the principal and agent do not share the same goal and/or 
there is asymmetric information. In the absence of some mechanism to align the 
interests of the two parties, the executives do not care about the value generated 
for the shareholders (Besanko et.al. 2010). Stock options help ensure 
accountability of an executive’s actions and provide incentives to align the 
interests of shareholders and executives, thereby reducing or eliminating 
principal-agent problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  
Optimal Contracting 
Efficient contracting concerns how to mitigate or eliminate the conflicts of 
interests between the principals (shareholders) and the agents (executives). The 
efficient contracts will be the ones that maximize shareholder value and at the 
same time are paying the executives an amount of compensation that gets him to 
take the job. In addition, the contracts have to recognize that executives are 
responding to the incentives specified (Murphy, 2012).  
Holmstrom (1979) describes the optimal incentive contracts in a principal– agent 
setting in which the principal knows exactly what actions he wants the agent to 
take, but the agent’s action is unobservable so he will not be able to say whether 
or not the agent in fact took that action. Holmstrom shows that the optimal 
contract will include any performance measure that are useful in determining what 
action the agent took, and that any imperfect information about actions or states of 
nature can be used to improve the contracts.  This is, however, not applicable in 
the realistic case where the shareholders do not know precisely what actions they 
want the executives to take, and have to trust their money to self-concerned 
executives specifically because they have superior skill or information in making 
investment decisions (Holmstrom, 1992) 
Cost-Value Gap 
The shareholders and executives will differ in terms of option-valuation due to 
their different risk-profile. Risk is defined as “the extent to which there is 
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uncertainty about outcomes” (Sitkin and Pablo, 1992). Shareholders tend to be 
well diversified and hence practically risk-neutral. Executives, on the other hand, 
are forced (by vesting requirements, board pressure etc.) to hold more company 
equity than is desirable in terms of portfolio diversification (Drobetz et.al. 2007). 
In addition executives are overinvested in the company because they hold too 
much of their physical and human capital there, hence they are more risk-averse. 
Since executive stock options have restrictions on trading- and hedging activities, 
a divergence between the cost and the value of the options arises. The opportunity 
cost is the amount the company would have received from selling the option to an 
outside investor in a tradable market. To a risk-averse, undiversified executive, 
this cost is significantly greater than the value of the option; hence they will value 
the options below their cost to the shareholders. This gap needs to be weighed 
against the incentive benefits in order to determine the optimal stock option 
compensation plan (Hall and Murphy, 2002).   
CEOs pay from the 1980s until present 
The US has been pioneers for CEO-pay the last century and our thesis will be 
based on the development in the US and the entry into Norway. Further we will 
elaborate important events that have led up to where we are today considering 
CEO pay and compensation.  
 
Murphy states that the attempt of “explaining” the CEO pay without considering 
the causes and consequences of government interventions over the last century 
with regards to executive compensation is futility (Murphy, 2012). During the 
1990s there was an explosion in the use of stock options, and Murphy (2012) 
describes six factors that he believes contributed to this explosion.  
It started with the pressure from shareholders for equity-based pay in the 1980s. 
Institutions, inefficient firms and shareholders encouraged that pay should be 
more linked to shareholder performance. In the US in 1991, the US Security and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) came up with a new holding period rule. The six 
month holding rule was reformed into no holding period, meaning that exercising 
options could immediately be sold after exercised.  
In 1992, SEC issued a new regulation called the SEC option disclosure rule. This 
disclosure rules stated that only the number of options granted, and not the value 
of grated options, needed to be disclosed.  
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In 1993 the Clinton administration decided a new bill of a $ 1 million 
deductibility cap. This was maybe one of the main outcomes that led to the 
increase in use of stock option. The purpose of this bill was not met, because the 
intention was to reduce the amount of executive compensation.  
In 1995 the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) tried to issue a new 
accounting rule, that granted options should be expensed at fair market value, 
without the any success.  
During the 1990s NYSE came up with a listing requirement. Top-executives 
needed to get approval of their equity plans from shareholders. To avoid this 
regulation and bypass shareholders vote, options were given to lower level 
employees and executives instead. 
After the scandals in firms like Enron, WorldCom, Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, 
Arthur Anderson and others in the start of the 21st century, the Congress in the US 
passed on the Sabanes-Oxly act in 2002 (Murphy, 2012). Even though the primary 
target for this act was to regulate accounting firms, auditors, and board of 
directors of publicly tradedcompanies, the Congress also made it effective for 
executive pay.  
In 2005 “option backdating” became a known practice to the public. The principle 
behind this was backdating of option agreements, as the option was granted at an 
earlier date than it originally was, and the option was now “in-the-money” instead 
of “out-of-the-money”. Companies that performed backdating falsified the option 
agreement, and also committed accounting fraud (Murphy, 2012). But the change 
in 2002 of the accounting regulations stopped the illegal backdating for top-
executives. By 2010 the SEC had managed the struggle against backdating.  
Among these changes in the first decade of the new century, a shift in in 
composition of CEO pay and regulations, lead to a downturn in stock option 
grants as CEO compensation from 2001 to 2011, as the first decrease of this kind 
since 1970 (Murphy, 2012). With the decline in stock option grants in 2001, the 
increase in stock grants as a combination of restricted stocks and performance 
shares became a fact towards and during 2011. The Internet Bobble in the early 
2000s and the stock market crash were reasons for the drop in option grants and 
rise in use of restricted stocks. Murphy (2012) also states that over the last 60 
years, during every recession, the use of stock options has dropped substantially.  
From June 15 in 2005 an accounting bill was finally issued for stock options, 
obliging companies to expense the granted stock options at fair value. During the 
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financial crises in 2007-2008, Leman Brothers went bankrupt as one of many 
huge banks. “Limiting executive pay, however, was a long-time top priority for 
Democrats and some Republican congressmen, who viewed the “Wall Street 
bonus culture” as a root cause of the financial crisis” (Murphy, 2012).  
In 2010-2011 the Dodd-Franklin Act was among other things, a reform act of 
executive compensation. Its overall purpose was to regulate pay for all financial 
institutions (Murphy, 2012).  
 
In Scandinavia and Europe stock option compensation plans became common by 
the end of the 1990s (Oxelheim and Randoy, 2008). In the late 1990s and 
beginning of 2000, the status for CEO compensation in Norway and Sweden was 
small compared to other countries in Europe and substantially smaller than in the 
US. This may be due to how egalitarian these countries are and the CEOs total 
compensation follow the domestic tendency rather than that of international 
companies (Randoy and Nielsen, 2002). It follows that the Scandinavian countries 
are characterized by economic transparency, high taxes, and a huge public sector. 
In 1999 Swedish CEOs made twelve times as much as the average employee and 
Norway even less than Sweden, compared to the CEOs on the S&P 500 that 
earned on average 475 times more than the average employee (Randoy and 
Nielsen, 2002). 
Randoy and Nielsen (2002) argue that there are four main characteristics why 
CEO pay is at its low level. The first argument is that CEOs receive higher pay 
because their position is more demanding and not because the position is 
important. The second argument is the strong social democratic influence of union 
representation in the boards of mostly every publicly tradedcompany. The third 
argument says that the openness of CEO compensation to the public has forced 
boards to set the level of compensation at a decent level. The last argument states 
that the stockholders minority rights in Scandinavia have resulted in opposition of 
high CEO pay level. 
 
The regulations above concern US companies, but there are also international 
regulations that affect the use of executive stock options for countries like 
Norway. Accounting legislations for share-based payment in Norway did not 
follow any specific accounting rules before the international standard, 
International Financial Reporting Standard 2 (IFRS-2), was implemented in 
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20053. This legislation affected the use of options in Norwegian firms listed on the 
Oslo Stock Exchange. 
 
With the complexity and continuous changes in the structure of executive stock 
options, regulations and accounting rules also change continuously. The 
introduction of the IFRS-2 is an example of this. The International Accounting 
Standards Board (IASB) released in 2005 the IFRS-2, which gave new rules and 
regulations to the use of executive stock options4. The most important change in 
Norway was the regulation that firms on the Oslo Stock Exchange needed to 
expense these executive stock options. After January 1 in 2005 the IFRS-2 and 
Norwegian Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (Norwegian GAAP), are 
more or less the same5, and due to this our focus concerning accounting rules will 
be based on IFRS-2 from this date. The IFRS-2 has the objective to specify the 
financial reporting by a firm when it undertakes a share-based payment 
transaction6.  
 
After the financial crises in 2007-2008, EU introduced a directive for financial 
institutions called Capital Requirements Directive III (CRD III)7. The objective 
for this directive was to create specific policies concerning requirements for 
variable remuneration regarding share-based deferred payment. Development of 
certain performance criteria was subject to accounting rules in IFRS-2.  This 
directive says inter alia that it should be a balanced ratio and limitation between 
fixed and variable remuneration in order to account for all types of risk, both 
current and future. Also for how long variable remuneration shall be deferred and 
rules regarding how fast vesting of such instruments shall be succeed. New 
regulations demand more advanced knowledge in order to handle these share-
based payment engagements. 
                                                
3 http://revregn.no/index.php?seks_id=26917&element=kapittel 
4 http://eifrs.ifrs.org/eifrs/bnstandards/en/2012/ifrs2.pdf 
5 Fokus på IFRS, aksjebasert betaling, KPMG. 
6 http://www.ifrs.org/IFRSs/Documents/English%20Web%20summaries/IFRS%202.pdf 
7 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:329:0003:0035:EN:PDF 
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Hypotheses 
The fundamental research question we seek to answer is: What motivates the use 
of executive stock options in Norwegian firms? We want to test more 
specifically, and thus our hypothesis will appear as the following:  
 
Cost value gap: 
H0: Value gap does not exist  
HA: Value gap exists 
 
Accounting legislations: 
H0: Change in accounting legislations leads to no change in the use of stock 
options as CEO pay  
HA: Change in accounting legislations leads to change in the use of stock options 
as CEO pay 
 
Transparency within the country: 
H0: High level of transparency do not change the use of stock options 
HA: High level of transparency changes the use of stock options 
 
Our motivation for stating these hypotheses, and the framework we will use to test 
them, will be further discussed in the next section.  
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Methodology 
Cost-value gap in executive stock options 
Hall and Murphy (2002) identify and estimate the magnitude of the gap between 
the cost and value of options, and demonstrate that this gap has implications for 
several issues related to stock options, e.g. why executives often argue that Black-
Scholes values are too high, why executives typically demand large premiums to 
exchange options for cash, and why companies allow executives to exercise 
options prior to the expiration date. The latter is generally advantageous to both 
the executives and the shareholders. We intend to follow the same approach in 
order to see if such gaps exist in Norwegian firms, and to what extent. The 
benefits of stock option compensation are well understood and widely accepted, 
so it is surprising that its costs have received much less attention (Drobetz et.al. 
2007). Assessing the gap between value and cost will help explain what motivates 
(or prevents) the use of executive stock option compensation in Norwegian firms 
since in example; if the cost-value gap is large this would indicate that the purpose 
of options as compensation, that they should provide executives with incentives to 
act in a certain way, will be violated. The cost-value gap represents a cost for the 
company, hence the larger the gap, the higher the costs. This could be an 
explanation to why firms do not (or should not) use stock options to create 
incentives for their executives.  
 
In order to identify and estimate the magnitude of the cost-value gap, both the cost 
and the value of stock options need to be estimated. In addition a measurement of 
the incentives created by such options will be provided. The definition of the 
value of executive stock options is divided into two parts; the economic cost to the 
firm, and the economic value to the executives. The value to risk-averse 
executives will be estimated using the “certainty equivalence” (CE) approach 
developed by Lambert et al. (1991), so that value is defined as a certainty 
equivalent in a utility-function framework (Hall and Murphy, 2002). By doing so, 
there will be evidence that e.g. Black-Scholes in general overestimates the value 
an executive places on an option (Hall and Murphy, 2002). Black-Scholes and 
other option pricing models assume that investors are risk-neutral and that all 
assets appreciate at the risk-free rate, however these assumptions are not 
describing the situation executives are facing. Since an executive is risk-averse, 
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not well-diversified and is facing restrictions on the use of the options, Black-
Scholes and other common valuation methods are not appropriate (Hall and 
Murphy, 2002).  
 
Following the CE-approach by Hall and Murphy (2002), we assume that an 
executive’s utility over wealth is with constant relative risk aversion, and we 
measure the value of an option to an undiversified executive as the amount of 
riskless cash compensation a recipient would exchange for the option. An 
executive’s risk adjusted compensation is the certainty equivalent that equals the 
expected utilities in equation (3) in Hall and Murphy (2002, p.7). In addition we 
assume that CAPM holds. The value of the executive stock option using this 
approach depends on nine parameters, where the first six are identical to the ones 
in Black-Scholes: exercise price, stock price, dividend yield, volatility, risk-free 
rate, maturity, the executives’ risk aversion, his initial wealth and the fraction of 
his wealth that is tied to firm performance. Hall and Murphy (2002) introduce 
“executive value lines”, which plot the certainty equivalents of options to 
executives as a function of the underlying stock. With this analysis, the last three 
of the nine parameters were identified.  
The risk-free wealth of a company’s executive, w, will in our case be the 
Norwegian CEOs non-firm related salary.  In addition to this non-firm related 
wealth of w, we assume that the executives hold s shares of company stock and 
are given n options to buy n shares of stock at exercise price X in T years.  
Accounting legislations 
In 2002-2003 a change in accounting regulation for options in the US led to a 
decrease in the use of granted stock options for CEOs because the cost of granting 
options changed. One factor that led to this regulation was the accounting 
scandals, where firms like Enron and Arthur Anderson played a huge part.  These 
changes can be viewed in figure 3.6 in Murphy (2012, pp. 82-83).  
 
From June 15 in 2005 FASB decided that all US firms needed to expense options 
when granting stock options. This accounting law had been discussed for several 
years before it became effective as law, and then companies had time to adapt to it 
gradually. This is similar to the IFRS-2 regulation, as mentioned above, in which 
firms on the Oslo Stock Exchange are regulated under. In addition, the same 
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regulation under FASB in the US required that all firms needed to record 
expenses for options granted before 2005, which led to many companies 
exercising options they already possessed before this new accounting legislation 
became effective. 
 
We will look at the pioneers in the US when it comes to treating options as 
executive compensation. We have shown that current and upcoming accounting 
regulations play a big role in how companies structure stock options as CEO pay, 
and their motivation of using such instruments. There have been done numerous 
studies on CEO pay in the US with regards to old and current accounting 
regulations. We want to look if Norwegian accounting regulation affects CEO pay 
in Norwegian firms. Accounting regulations will be seen as an explanatory 
variable to how CEO pay changes when changes in accounting regulation occur. 
In our thesis we will look at the last decade, from 2000 until 2010, especially how 
implementing IFRS-2 in 2005 changed the structure of CEO pay. We want to see 
if changes in accounting regulations play a significant part, if the structure of CEO 
pay happens approximately in the same period.  
 
Transparency within the country 
Countries operate with different levels of transparency, where Norway has a 
higher level of transparency than for example the US. Norwegian law requires a 
high degree of openness and this has forced boards to decrease the level of CEO 
compensations (Randøy and Nielsen, 2002). We want to look at different degrees 
of transparency in order to find out if this affects the use of executive stock 
options. To answer the hypothesis we will perform a comparison between Norway 
and the US.  
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Data 
Cost-value gap in executive stock options 
We will use Norwegian data from companies on the Oslo Stock Exchange, with a 
timeframe ranging from the year 2000 to 2005. To simplify we will only look at 
the CEOs of these companies. Compensation data will be collected from the 
companies’ annual reports, while all other data will be obtained from Datastream. 
 
Variables: 
CEOs non-firm related salary: estimated based on individual compensation data 
collected from companies’ annual reports.  
 
Risk-free rate (rf) and market return (rm) will be based on the historical properties 
of the Norwegian stock market. 
Firm-specific volatilities will be estimated based on firm’s monthly stock return 
over the period from January 2000 to December 2010.   
Firm-specific betas will be estimated by taking company returns and divide them 
by market returns. The returns will be in the same time period as for firm-specific 
volatilities. 
All of this data will be collected from Datastream.  
Accounting legislations 
We will use the same timeframe from 2000 until 2005. Our objective here is to go 
into present and previous accounting legislations and compare it to structural 
changes in CEO pay in Norwegian firms listed on the Oslo Stock Exchange. Our 
argument for only using publicly traded firms is due to the transparency of 
information we can obtain. Through changes in accounting legislations as an 
exogenous variable we will observe how CEO pay change, in isolation from other 
explanatory variables. 
Transparency within the country 
Information regarding transparency and its effect on executive stock options in the 
US will be collected through previous studies. While information regarding 
Norway will be done in a similar way in addition to performing interviews.  
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